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In this issue

- 2** Saudi Arabia: Preserving and Strengthening the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Process
by HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Founder and Trustee of the King Faisal Foundation and Chairman of the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies
- 8** Chronicle of a Genocide Foretold
by H.E. Evarist Bartolo, Former Foreign Minister of Malta
- 15** From Diplomacy to Trade: The Role of Economic Ties in Strengthening UK-Arab Relations
by Mr. Robin Lamb, Board Member of The Egyptian British Chamber of Commerce and Court Member of The British University in Egypt
- 17** Student Research Paper: The Changing Dynamics of China-MENA Relations Post-2011: From Risk Aversion to Greater Engagement
by Farah Medhat, BUE Political Science Student, Degree year 3

Saudia Arabia: Preserving and Strengthening the Middle East WMB-Free Zone Process

By HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Founder and Trustee of the King Faisal Foundation and Chairman of the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies

INTRODUCTION

Over the last five decades, many regions in the world – Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia have succeeded in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). Despite decades of calls by regional and international actors for a NWFZ in the Middle East, tangible progress towards realizing this noble and vital goal remains elusive as stakeholders lack the necessary political will to move forward. If the states in more peaceful regions saw a need to eliminate the danger of nuclear weapons from their regions, then states in a conflict-ridden region such as the Middle East should feel an even more urgent need to do the same. Indeed, they should feel a need to go further by banning all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), given the history of these weapons in the region.

Prohibiting nuclear weapons and other WMD is the only means to inhibit states of the region from seeking such destructive weapons even if justified as a means for deterrence. Therefore, establishing a Middle East WMD-free zone (ME WMDFZ) as a means to ensure that the Middle East is safer and more secure is the main incentive for Saudi Arabia to pursue this goal.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AROUND SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia is concerned about Iran's and Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. The Middle East WMDFZ could be a solution to both.

The security environment around Saudi Arabia has seen some important developments in recent years. An example is the rise in Turkey's capability to project power in the region, including its direct military interventions in the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya and its continued support of Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Arab countries, which has raised security concerns for several states in the region. It is safe to assume that Turkey will continue to play a more central role in the security thinking in Saudi Arabia if it continues this pattern of behaviour. The ME WMDFZ could create an opportunity for the states of the

region to engage formally with Turkey on security matters. Given the country's current, more "Middle Eastern" orientation and the nuclear weapons stored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at Incirlik Air Base, it is inevitable that Turkey would need to be included in some fashion within the zone treaty.

This does not imply a need to redraw the borders of the zone to include Turkey, but rather to find other means of inclusion, such as protocols akin to those for the five nuclear weapon states in other NWFZ treaties or by including it as observer state to the negotiation of the treaty and any follow-on process to implement it.

RISING THREATS OF REGIONAL PROLIFERATION OF OTHER WMD AND MISSILES

While nuclear weapons are clearly an important concern, currently chemical and biological threats are arguably more immediate in the Middle East, as chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in the region. The recent pandemic also highlights the scale of death and disruption that could be inflicted if pathogens were to be weaponized.



Another important angle from which to look at these threats was made apparent by the tragic blast at Beirut port in August 2020. It is conceivable that an attack using a short-range missile could target a facility containing toxic chemicals (for peaceful purposes) and cause untold destruction. Such an attack could have consequences for several states of the region. The need for Iran's missile programme to be part of the ME WMD FZ discussion is highlighted by such scenarios as well as the possibility of this sort of attack being carried out by non-state actors sponsored by Iran or others. New thinking on these issues is necessary.

A STALLED PROCESS

Although the above paragraphs demonstrate why a ME WMD FZ would provide a valuable framework to address several ills in the region, the reality remains that despite more than 50 years of efforts, we are no nearer to realizing this goal today than we were then.

Among the key reasons for this lag is the limited awareness around issues such as the potential for more states in the region to seek nuclear latency or even fully fledged weapon programmes; the risks associated with peaceful programmes; the lack of trust among the main stakeholders; as well as an absence of will, especially by the nuclear weapon states of the UN Security Council. There is also limited



awareness of the possible routes to address these issues through a ME WMDFZ process; or of the possibilities for regional dialogue or even cooperation that could be created by or during the process.

But with developments in Iran's nuclear programme occupying more attention in all circles, there is an opportunity to invigorate debate on the ME WMDFZ by raising awareness nationally and regionally about the threats and, more importantly, the practical means by which we can address them. This can help give more concrete form to what is currently seen as a more abstract concept and enable members of the international security establishment to meaningfully engage. The ME WMDFZ is also seen more as an Arab concern. Hence, there are benefits to the promotion of a unified Arab position. Given that none of the 22 member states of the League of Arab States possess nuclear weapons and all have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), their position is that they have "done their bit" to demonstrate their support for the establishment of the zone. Furthermore, the reality that the Middle East has lived with a nuclear-armed Israel for 60 years should not result in the sense – both internationally and regionally – that there is no urgency to address this.

While nuclear weapons are clearly an important concern, currently chemical and biological threats are arguably more immediate in the Middle East, as chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in the region.

In addition, without a just resolution to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, the question of Palestine will continue to complicate prospects for a ME WMDFZ, even if all Arab states normalized relations with Israel as the present events in Gaza demonstrate. It is not realistic to think that a regional security regime can be built among states where one continues to occupy the territories of another. It is still an issue that is important and is in the hearts and minds of millions of Arabs and Muslims across the region. Only with the equitable resolution of this issue can the way be paved for better regional ties with Israel and progress on any cooperative mechanisms.

The active engagement of Israel, as the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in the region, and Iran, as a nuclear-aspirant state, is crucial to the success or failure of the ME WMDFZ process. The failure of all previous attempts to establish the zone rests on the shoulders of Israel and the continued justification by the United States of America of Israel's position by upholding Israel's nuclear ambiguity, which is antithetical to the establishment of a zone.

The United States and Israel demand that others, such as Iran (and previously Iraq, Libya and Syria) adhere to the non-proliferation norm while they retain their own capabilities and while the United States drags its feet on fulfilling its obligation under Article VI of the NPT to fully disarm. This double standard has and will continue to cast a shadow over the process and undermine faith in the seriousness and viability of the effort.



Each country in the Middle East has come to view any security threat as an existential threat. Israel's insistence on preserving its nuclear ambiguity only serves to give more credence to these perceptions.

The pursuit of the ME WMDFZ by the NPT review conferences has been fruitless due to the United States' insistence on not embarrassing Israel for being the only country in the Middle East which has not signed the NPT. Even when the United States agreed to support a zone conference as part of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and just as the agreed conference was about to take place in 2012, the United States declared its opposition to holding the conference. A more consistent US approach would aid in convincing Israel to pursue this goal in a serious manner.

DRIVERS AND INCENTIVES FOR ENGAGEMENT

Saudi Arabia, like all Arab states, believes in principled common regional security structures that are based on respect for the existing national states, that encourage cooperation and coordination between states, and that preserve regional peace and security. Saudi Arabia's leading role within the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is aimed at promoting these goals. Saudi Arabia is also open for new arrangements if they lead to the creation of a new regional security structure that serves the end goal of achieving stability, peace and security in the Middle East. Within this context, Saudi Arabia, as well as other Arab states, believes in the vital need to establish a ME WMDFZ. As is known, no Arab state, including Saudi Arabia, is pursuing military nuclear capability, all are signatories to the NPT, and the vast majority are signatories to other treaties dealing with WMD.

Beyond the clear benefits for the region and the world of ridding the Middle East of WMD, Saudi Arabia also has concrete national security concerns that could be addressed through a ME WMDFZ. These relate in particular to the status of Israel's and Iran's nuclear programmes and their delivery systems. A treaty creating a ME WMDFZ may also lead to the creation of a forum to address the lack of trust and the need for honest dialogue among states in the region. Such a regional forum could create the space to address several outstanding issues, such as the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, terrorism and water scarcity, to name a few. Despite its reservations, Saudi Arabia had hoped that the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran's nuclear programme could help pave the way for such a forum and that it would be the first of many steps that would address other aspects of Iranian behaviour in the region. However, Saudi Arabia became disillusioned with the agreement as it became clear that further steps were not going to materialize. On the contrary, Iran took advantage of this agreement to

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increase its financing of non-state actors and did not cease its interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours. In a sense, the JCPOA freed up Iran's hand to act more belligerently in the region. The fanning of sectarian flames by Iran has been much more harmful to the security and stability of the region than its nuclear programme. More lives have been lost to this sectarian policy than to Iran's nuclear programme that further entrenches and legitimizes the revolution and its organs. The Kingdom's reproachment with Iran is geared to tackle these challenges. It is still a work in progress.

The 2015 agreement with Iran should not be seen as an alternative to the zone as the JCPOA would not prevent Iran from preserving its nuclear weapon programme and only postponed that probability for the duration of the agreement; 15 years from 2015, less than 9 years from the time of writing. It also allows Iran to enrich uranium to just below 5 per cent, thus allowing it to continue to acquire the materials and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The ME WMDFZ must have stronger provisions that apply to all countries in the region and ban all activities that go beyond the rights of states under the NPT. Most importantly, the JCPOA provided no guarantee whatsoever that Iran will not embark on developing nuclear weapons once the 15-year period is over. A ME WMDFZ would help to mitigate that possibility by implementing stricter inspection and verification, combining both international and regional mechanisms, such as mutual visits and inspections.

In Saudi Arabia, it is the hope that the administration of US President Joe Biden will not repeat the mistakes and shortcomings of the JCPOA by attempting to return to the deal "as is" but will rather use the renewed negotiations to address additional important issues. An incremental approach such as returning to the JCPOA "as is" will trap diplomacy and allow Iran to further develop its nuclear programme in the meantime. From the perspective of Saudi Arabia, a noncomprehensive deal will not achieve lasting peace and security in our region. Any new agreement should encompass all issues of concern to friends and allies of the United States in the region. Otherwise, the Iranian nuclear threat will remain.

In the same light, Saudi Arabia views the Israeli nuclear programme as no less of a threat to the region's peace and security so long as Israel remains outside the NPT. Israel's policies justify the efforts of Iran and perhaps other countries in the region to acquire nuclear weapons in the future. Historically, the monopoly of such a weapon is never sustainable. This risk of such horizontal proliferation in the region should be an incentive for countries – including Israel – to abandon their nuclear postures and seriously negotiate a ME WMDFZ on an equal footing.

SMALL STEPS TO BRING CLOSER A ME WMDFZ

There is a dire need for clear, honest, and direct discussion of the issue and the aims, scope, and the obstacles a ME WMDFZ faces. Raising awareness of the issue in the Middle East is also crucial to ensure wider engagement from the governments and peoples of the region. States that have recently signed normalization agreements with Israel – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco – should



leverage their relationship with Israel to also discuss the ME WMDfz issue. Public statements from these countries and others could also help bring public attention to the zone.

A clear and honest dialogue at a subregional level could also support efforts toward realizing the ME WMDfz by addressing tensions and mistrust between

GCC states and Iran. In the past, the GCC had proposed to Iran the development of confidence-building measures, which could be modelled on the 10 principles of the Helsinki Accords. Such an approach would still garner support in the GCC and could even be revisited as part of the current talks between Riyadh and Tehran.

As envisioned in my study published by the Belfer Center, a genuine and serious effort to construct a ME WMDfz could benefit from a United Nations Security Council resolution whereby the permanent members of the Security Council bolster incentives for states in the region through guaranteeing a nuclear security umbrella for joining states; rewarding the states that join the ME WMDfz with economic and technical support; and sanctioning those that refuse to join.

Such a declaration of intent could be sufficient to incentivize Israel to stop its dawdling, join the NPT and accept the hand of peace extended to it since 2002 by the Arab Peace Initiative.² Iran will be equally incentivized to come clean on its secretive and suspicious programme. Failing to create a WMD-free zone in the Middle East will certainly incentivize some countries in the region to undertake what may prove to be a fateful decision that will enhance instability rather than confirm security and peace for our region.



His Royal Highness Prince Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud was appointed as an Advisor at the Royal Court in 1973. In 1977 HRH was appointed Director General (with a rank of Minister) of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), Saudi Arabia's main foreign intelligence service and served as the head of the GID until August 2001.

In October 2002 His Royal Highness was appointed as the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. HRH served in that position until July 2005, when he was appointed as Ambassador to the United States. He retired in February 2007. A Founder and Trustee of the King Faisal Foundation, His Royal Highness is also the Chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies.

Additionally, His Royal Highness is a Trustee of the Oxford Islamic Center at Oxford University and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at Georgetown University. HRH received an honorary PhD in Law in 2010 from the University of Ulster in Ireland, an honorary PhD in International Politics in 2011 from the University of Hankuk in Korea and an honorary PhD in 2015 from the University of Shanghai.

His Royal Highness is an active participant in the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting and the Global Economic Symposium. In 2015, Italy granted the Mediterranean Award for Diplomacy to HRH.

Chronicle of a Genocide Foretold

By H.E. Evarist Bartolo, Former Foreign Minister of Malta

At the beginning of the present war on Gaza, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declared: *“Remember what Amalek has done to you, we have been commanded. And we do remember.”* He invoked the Bible: *“Now go, attack Amalek, and destroy all that they have, and spare no one; but kill both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.”*

Netanyahu calls Gaza ‘Amalek’. The Hebrew Bible describes Amalek as the recurrent enemy nation of the Israelites since at least 3,000 years ago. As the chosen people of God, the Israelites believe that they have the right and duty to exterminate Amalek. As the Amalekites could transform themselves to resemble animals, in order to avoid capture, it was considered necessary to destroy the livestock when destroying Amalek.

There are Talmudic commentators who argue that the calls to spare no Amalekite or “blot out their memory” are metaphorical and do not require the actual killing of Amalekites. Certainly, this is not the interpretation favoured by the Israeli leadership and their supporters.

Scholars like Norman Naimark, discussing the ethics of the commandment to exterminate all the Amalekites, including children, and the presumption of collective punishment describe it as genocidal.

Did the Amalekites exist in fact? Archaeological research has found no conclusive proof about them among the nomadic Arabs of the period. Hugo Winckler has concluded that there were no Amalekites and that the Biblical stories concerning them were entirely ahistorical and mythological. Some scholars do not dismiss

the possibility of Amalekite communities in the Negev highlands and Tel Masos. They contend that if this is the case, it is likely that the Israeli king Saul's anti-Amalekite campaigns 3,000 years ago were motivated by a strategic desire to wrest control of copper production at Tel Masos. Copper was valuable to the early Israelites and their theology and ritual.

What is indispensable for Netanyahu, to justify what Israel has done and is doing to the Palestinians, not only in Gaza, and not only in the last year, but since the birth of the Zionist movement in 1897, if Amalekites did not exist, it would be necessary to invent them in the image of the Palestinians.

Planned Hell

On 9 October 2023 Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant justified the planned mass slaughter of Gazans by declaring that “we are fighting human animals and we act accordingly”. He also said that Israel was moving to “a full-scale response” and that he had “removed every restriction” on Israeli forces, as well as presenting the road map of the impending genocide: “Gaza won’t return to what it was before. We will eliminate everything.”



On 10 October 2023, the head of the Israeli army's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Maj. Gen. Ghassan Alian, warned the Gaza residents: "Human animals must be treated as such. There will be no electricity and no water, there will only be destruction. You wanted hell, you will get hell".

The same day, Israeli army spokesperson Daniel Hagari vaunted about the deliberate destructive nature of Israel's bombing campaign in Gaza: "The emphasis is on damage and not on accuracy."

Israeli Minister of Energy and Infrastructure Israel Katz made it clear that the present war on Gaza had one objective – to empty Gaza of its people either by making them leave Gaza or by killing them all: "All the civilian population in Gaza is ordered to leave immediately. We will win. They will not receive a drop of water or a single battery until they leave the world."

The Israeli government cannot be accused of concealing its genocidal intent from day one of its present war on Gaza.

A Genocide Endorsed

Most of the American and European leaders endorsed what Israel declared openly that it was about to continue doing to the people of Gaza. Some of them, like the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, disingenuously said in October 2023: that "Israel is a democratic state guided by very humanitarian principles, so we can be certain that the Israeli army will respect the rules that arise from international law in everything it does."

Western elites have continued to look the other way on Israel's horrific campaign in Gaza, even as the death and destruction has been visible for months thanks to Arab satellite television channels and social media outlets that Western governments have been unable to control. The US and the UK use their veto in the Security Council to provide diplomatic support to Israel and more tangibly provide the bombs that are killing and destroying the people of Gaza and their land.

Recently, Francesca Albanese, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories Francesca Albanese denounced German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock's defense of Israel's bombing of Palestinian civilian displacement sites in Gaza, warning of the legal repercussions of supporting a state that commits international crimes. The rapporteur expressed her concern about Germany's position on Israel and Palestine and its "serious consequences."

"As a UN Independent Expert, I am deeply concerned by the stance Germany is taking on Israel/Palestine, and its dangerous implications and consequences. Minister Baerbock should be invited to provide the evidence of what she claims, and then explain how "civilian objects losing protected status" justify the massacres Israel is committing in Gaza and elsewhere."

Historical Context for Supporting Genocide

Israel has been acting with impunity for the last 76 years. International human rights lawyer Craig Mokhiber who formerly worked for the United Nations describes Israel as holding "the world record for breaching UN resolutions.



It has been found responsible for gross and systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law by successive UN commissions of inquiry and independent special procedures. Worse, it has killed more UN staff than any party in history (and by a wide margin), has detained and tortured UN staff, and has regularly attacked, slandered and obstructed the Organization and its duly-mandated operations.”

Despite all this, the United States considers Israel as a democratic state and morally superior to its neighbours. It invites Israel to participate in its Summits for Democracy as part of its self-righteous crusade to evangelise the rest of the world, casting itself as a choir of democratic angels against the hordes of autocratic devils. The total support of the West for Israel is better understood within a historical context as it is the result of the confluence of three rivers flowing into one big river of Zionist, European and American exceptionalism.

The Papal Bull of 1493 has provided the spiritual, political and legal justification for colonisation and the seizure of land not inhabited by Christians in Africa, Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the Americas.

On May 4, 1493, pope Alexander VI issued the infamous ‘Doctrine of Discovery’, decreeing that “any land not inhabited by Christians was available to be discovered, claimed and exploited by Christian rulers”. This was the time that the Europeans were discovering the so-called New World, or the Americas.

Pope Alexander VI declared that “the Catholic faith and the Christian religion be exalted, be everywhere increased and spread, that the health of souls be cared for and that barbarous

(sic) nations be overthrown and brought to the faith itself.” Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI had been asked to rescind and revoke the colonialist decree to no avail until Pope Francis finally obliged the Vatican do so in March 2023.

Dehumanisation of Colonised

The Papal Bull of 1493 has provided the spiritual, political and legal justification for colonisation and the seizure of land not inhabited by Christians in Africa, Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the Americas. It fuelled white supremacy and gave European settlers the sense that they were instruments of divine design and possessed cultural superiority over the rest of the world.

It created the ideology that supported the dehumanisation of those living in the newly discovered lands and made acceptable the dispossession, murder and forced assimilation of the indigenous people.

In the ‘Political uses of the past: the recent Mediterranean experience’ (2002) Jacques Revel and Giovanni Levi write: “...almost every nation in southeastern Europe is represented in its self-perception and national myth as the bulwark of a particular universal system of values (Christianity. Islam. and so on).”

Around 500 years ago the ‘Antemurale Christianitatis’ ran from one side of the Mediterranean to the other. It was a Papal label given to those countries as frontiers of Catholic Europe defending it mostly from the Ottoman Empire and Eastern Christian Orthodoxy.

This Antemurale myth insists on the countries’ inclusion into some larger cultural entity which is allegedly superior to other groups



which do not belong to it. This mindset facilitates the propensity of the people of Southern European countries to join entities like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a continuation of their mission of belonging to the West against the East and South.

Superiority and Dominance

The United States is driven by a belief in its exceptionalism considering itself to hold values and distinctive qualities in its political and economic system that make it unique in the world. In the last 60 years a new secular religion has been born in the United States where neoconservatism and neo-liberalism have merged in their belief that the US is better than other countries and has a superior culture and has a worldwide mission to spread capitalism and liberal democracy.

It is interesting to note that Mormons believe that America is the “promised land” that was settled by Lehi and his fellow Israelites. The influential Christian Zionists in the United States not only believe that Israel has a God-given right to the land of Israel but also put the Israel state on a pedestal and support it in all that it does. But it is the Israel lobby in the United States that ensures that the American political and security establishment not only shapes US domestic and foreign policy in the interests of Israel but also works constantly, in John Mearsheimer’s words to guarantee “that the United States and Israel are joined at the hip”. This explains why pro-Palestinian academics and students in the US have been treated so harshly when protesting against the genocide in Gaza.

In her article ‘Needing an Enemy: On the Manichean Mindset of the North Atlantic’s Foreign Policy Establishment’ (9 September 2020), Dr. Arta Moeini, Research Director of American Institute for Peace & Diplomacy writes how: “The dualistic paradigm of the international system during the U.S.-Soviet rivalry bred an entire generation to see the world through a black-and-white binary.”

The Other as a Demonized Enemy

She writes that “the North Atlantic elites continue to seek adversaries to demonize and “monsters to destroy” not only in order to justify their moral universalism and presumed ideological superiority” but also because of the “endless stream of funding from the defence industry, neoliberal and neoconservative foundations, as well as the ... bipartisanship” of the Democrats and the Republicans “around preserving the status quo”.

She says that the West has replaced the Soviet Union with Russia and China (and I would add countries like Iran and all others not resigned to the destiny that the West condemns them to) as the enemy in today’s holy war between good and evil ... “suggesting that the North Atlantic bloc holds a certain monopoly on all that is good and true.”

American economist Michael Hudson who worked in 1974 with Uzi Arad (former head of Mossad and present advisor to Netanyahu) says: “Everything that Israel is doing to the Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere throughout Israel was all pioneered in Vietnam. We had a chance to [get to] know each other very much (referring to Uzi Arad). And I could see that the intention from the very beginning was to get rid



of the Palestinians and indeed to use Israel as the basis for U.S. control of Near Eastern oil. ... what they wanted was the oil reserves in the Middle East. And again and again, I heard the phrase, 'you're our landed aircraft carrier in Israel'."

Kill the Palestinians

"So, what you're seeing today isn't simply the work of one man, of Benjamin Netanyahu. It's the work of the team that President Biden has put together. It's the team of Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor Blinken, and the whole deep state, the whole neocon group behind them, Victoria Nuland, and everyone. They're all self-proclaimed Zionists. And they've gone over this plan for essentially America's domination of the Near East for decade after decade...So I think I want to make it clear that this is not simply an Israeli war against Hamas. It's an American-backed Israeli war. Each of them has their own objectives. Israel's objective is to have a land without non-Jewish population. And America's aim is to have Israel acting as the local coordinator."

Hudson says that the playbook Israel is following today in Gaza was developed 50 years ago by the United States for Vietnam: "The aim all along has been to kill the Palestinians. Or first of all, to make life so unpleasant for them that they'll emigrate. That's the easy way. Why would anyone want to stay in Gaza when what's happening to them is what's happening today? You're going to leave. But if they don't leave, you're going to have to kill them, ideally by bombing because that minimizes the domestic casualties.... So, the genocide that you're seeing today is an explicit policy, and that was a policy of the forefathers, the founders of Israel. The idea

of a land without people was a land without Arabs in it, the land without non-Jewish people."

Apart from getting rid of the Palestinians and expanding into Gaza, new opportunities are being created to develop luxury beach properties and to exploit the deposits of natural gas in the sea off Gaza. To achieve this, Hudson says Israel has been killing journalists to stop them from reporting the war, bombing hospitals and health personnel so that the wounded have no one and nowhere to be taken care of: "... you bomb the greenhouses, you bomb the trees, you sink the fishing boats that have supplied food to the population. And then you aim at fighting the United Nations relief people."



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Ground Zero in Gaza

Last July, 'The Lancet', one of the world's leading medical journals in a scientific report called "Counting the dead in Gaza" showed that the Gaza death toll could be 186,000. That was four months ago. The report said that the number killed is around 8% of Gaza's population and is still a "conservative estimate."

On 30th September 2024 Oxfam issued a report concluding that more women and children have been killed in Gaza by the Israeli military over the past year for a similar period than in any



other conflict over the past 20 years. It also showed that up to 23 September 2024 Israeli explosive weapons hit on average homes every four hours, tents and temporary shelters every 17 hours, schools and hospitals every four days and aid distribution points and warehouses every 15 days.

Oxfam says that over 25,000 children have been traumatised deeply either by losing one or both parents and thousands of others are left “grappling with anxiety and severe physical injuries, with many having lost limbs.”

A joint World Bank, UN Report assessing damage to Gaza’s infrastructure between October 2023 and end of January 2024 finds that every sector of the economy has been affected: housing, water, health and education facilities, commercial and industrial buildings. Tens of millions tons of debris and rubble have been left following the bombing. This will take years to remove before recover and reconstruction can begin.

Destroying the Environment

In a similar report about the environmental impact of the war the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) found that most of Gaza’s environmental management has been reversed through the destruction of water desalination and wastewater treatment facilities, solar power infrastructure and investments in the Wadi Gaza Coastal wetland.

An estimated **39 million tonnes of debris have been generated by the conflict** posing risks to human health and the environment, from dust and contamination with unexploded ordnance, asbestos, industrial and medical waste,

and other hazardous substances. Human remains buried beneath the debris must be dealt with sensitively and appropriately.

The water, sanitation, and hygiene systems are almost entirely defunct. Gaza’s five wastewater treatment plants have shut down, with sewage contaminating beaches, coastal waters, soil, and freshwater with a host of pathogens, nutrients, microplastics, and hazardous chemicals. This poses immediate and long-term threats to the health of Gazans, marine life, and arable lands.

The solid waste management system is severely damaged. Five out of six solid waste management facilities in Gaza are damaged. By November 2023, 1,200 tonnes of rubbish were accumulating daily around camps and shelters. A shortage of cooking gas has forced families to burn wood, plastic and waste instead, endangering women and children in particular. This, coupled with fires and burning fuels, is likely to have sharply lowered Gaza’s air quality.

Even Strawberries and Olives Considered Enemies

Munitions containing heavy metals and explosive chemicals have been deployed in Gaza’s densely populated areas, contaminating soil and water sources, and posing a risk to human health which will persist long after the cessation of hostilities. Unexploded ordnance poses especially serious risks to children.

Destruction of solar panels is expected to leak lead and other heavy metals, causing a new kind of risk to Gaza’s soil and water.

The UNEP report also concludes that the Hamas’ tunnel system and Israel’s efforts to



destroy will cause long term risks to human health from groundwater contamination and to buildings constructed on potentially unstable land surfaces.

All this shows that the environment is not just collateral damage but a planned target of the Israeli army. Samar Safiya, a Gazan environmental activist says: “In the place of orchards, sandy beaches, and strawberry fields that were once the pride of Gazans, the coastal territory is now a dystopian landscape of military bases, craters, and ruins. In northern Gaza, two-thirds of the land was agricultural - now there's nothing left. More than 80,000 tons of Israeli bombs have spared neither fields, olive trees nor lemon trees. This environmental destruction accompanies the massacres and genocide,”

Towards a Global Gaza?

The war on Gaza has not only destroyed millions of lives and Gaza's environment, it is also demolishing the rule of international law and the basis for founding the United Nations in 1945. Craig Murray, a former British ambassador says: “Western countries have been planning this genocide for months, if not years, and this

coordinated line that Israel is not breaching international humanitarian law - when it plainly is, and when the latest ICJ ruling was unanimous - 15 to nil ordering a complete ceasefire - just responded to with the Ali Shifa Massacre and with yet more more bombings. And it's not just that this is destroying the fabric of international law. It's making a mockery of the Security Council. It's making a mockery of the International Court of Justice, for the whole fabric of post-1946 international law.”

To a large extent what is happening in Gaza is symptomatic and a microcosm of what is happening in the world at large where the old unipolar world dominated by the United States is refusing to die and where the new multipolar world creating alternative institutions to those dominated by the US is struggling to be born. If this painful and turbulent transition is not managed within a framework of basic coexistence and the enemies confronting each other continue to go up the escalation ladder, the whole world will end up like Gaza, through nuclear annihilation. Will we manage to step back from the abyss like we did 62 years ago in the Cuban missile crisis?



H.E. Evarist Bartolo 1992 – 2022: 30 years Member of Parliament, Labour Party, 11 years as Minister for Education and Employment and then as Minister for European and Foreign Affairs. In 2017 chaired the European Council on Education. 1984. – 2017: Lectured in Media Studies at the University of Malta. In this period worked as TV Journalist and as News Editor. Served as Commonwealth Election Observer in Kenya (August 2022). Campaigned successfully for the introduction of divorce and civil rights and marriage equality in Malta; for good governance:

Ombudsman, Freedom of Information Act, Commissioner for Standards in Public Life; Abolition of Censorship and Better Protection for Journalists. As Foreign and European Affairs Minister promoted relations between the EU and the Mediterranean and the EU and Africa. Promoted also the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons, promoted conflict resolution through the values of mediation, negotiations and peacebuilding, democracy and human rights. Writes regularly on social media and Maltese newspapers. Lectures in diplomacy and education. Invited to participate in international conferences on education and geopolitical issues in different countries including Strasbourg, Istanbul, Amman, Bruges, Warsaw, Bologna, Lunberg, Brussels, Paris, Moscow and Washington. Studies and graduated from the University of Malta, Mass Media Institute of Stanford University and the University of Wales. Appointed Honorary Professor of Shanghai University of Legal and Political Studies.

From Diplomacy to Trade: The Role of Economic Ties in Strengthening UK-Arab Relations

By Mr. Robin Lamb, Board Member of The Egyptian British Chamber of Commerce and Court Member of The British University in Egypt



I am asked from time to time why I, a retired diplomat, am involved in promoting bilateral trade between the UK and Egypt and other Arab countries. After all, the enquirer points out, I have no business experience and diplomacy is about policy and protocol. I reply that the work of a UK diplomat covers the full range of a bilateral (or multilateral, in some appointments) relationship and includes the promotion of trade and investment; that the UK has an high propensity to import and needs to export visible goods and services to cover the costs; that trade adds to the wealth of both parties involved; and that shared economic interests help support friendly and peaceful political relationships: if bilateral business was not important in itself, its vital contribution to political stability and amity would justify the attention of even a diplomat who only looked at a bilateral relationship through the prism of politics. There are of course situations which undermine the positive outcomes of trade and I will touch on them in this article – as well as making the case for shared economic interests.

Total UK imports of goods and services came to 36.09% of GDP in 2022. Exports amounted to 33.43% resulting in a trade deficit of 2.66%. A trade deficit is not always a bad thing because it can represent an active economy investing in growth but although the deficit was partly offset by net FDI inflows (1.5% of GDP in 2022), the case for trade promotion by the Government and private sector trade associations in support of British companies who actually produce and deliver the exports is clear.



British Embassies therefore include UK and locally engaged officers whose task is to promote bilateral business, by assisting British companies entering the market with information and introductions. They are supported from London by the Department for Business & Trade (DBT) and work with private sector trade associations, independent of government, like the Egyptian British Chamber of Commerce (EBCC) or the Libyan British Business Council (LBBC). These associations are supported by British and host nation corporate members and work with their local British Embassies on trade missions, developing understanding, building networks and other exchanges in both directions.

In my case, my diplomatic career included a two year secondment from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) to the Government export department at the time (now the DBT), as Director of global support for the UK's exporters of services ranging from financial services through education and health to the creative industries. I then went to Kuwait as Deputy Ambassador, with duties including oversight of the Embassy commercial team, and thereafter as Ambassador to Bahrain where I continued to give trade promotion and contact with the Kingdom's economic Ministers, the Central Bank and the heads of national industries similar attention to our bilateral political relationship. Since retiring from the FCDO, I have worked with the Arab British Chamber of Commerce, the Middle East Association and, more recently, the EBCC and the LBCC.



INTERNATIONAL TRADE IS A
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ENABLES COUNTRIES TO
STRENGTHEN CONNECTIVITY IN
TRANSPORTATION,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
ENERGY AND FINANCE.

My commitment to supporting bilateral trade and investment is underpinned by the encouraging knowledge that the economic 'law' of comparative advantage works for both (or all) countries in a business relationship. It recognises that two or more countries can focus on producing goods and services in which they have particular strengths while importing other products from trade partners who are better qualified to supply them. The result of this specialisation is to increase the wealth of both countries beyond the level they could each achieve by producing all they needed themselves. This is why international trade is a leading driver of growth. And it is supported by modern technology which enables countries to strengthen connectivity in transportation, telecommunications, energy and finance.

But the positive impact of international trade is dependent on the elimination of barriers to trade and it can be diminished - if not negated - by unequal trade arrangements. This was the story of the 1930s and the surge of protectionism in response to the Great Depression. The damage this did to the international economy and trade was recognised in the 1940s and led to the adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in 1947 with the purpose of the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis".

The GATT evolved through eight rounds of multilateral talks culminating in the Uruguay Round and the creation in 1995 of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO provides for a rules based international trade system and a forum for resolving policy disputes. It has fostered further reductions to



trade barriers and the development of measures to level the international playing field, most recently through the finalisation in February 2024 of the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement¹ “to help signatories attract foreign direct investment they want to drive growth, productivity gains, job creation and integration into global supply chains” (WTO Director General, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala).

The WTO has its detractors who identify it with the downsides of globalisation and support a return to protectionism. One of these ‘downsides’ has been a perceived erosion of national sovereignty which in the UK’s case has led to the country’s ‘Brexit’ from the EU, the greatest act of economic self-harm my country has caused itself in living memory. I hope no others will follow suit and that critics of the WTO will see that the solution to negative aspects of globalisation lies in further negotiation through the WTO, not a lurch to protectionism. To paraphrase Churchill’s dictum on democracy, the WTO is the worst form of [economic] governance – apart from all the others! Without a rules based international system, unequal trade would become the norm.

The erosion of the rules based system would also undermine the ‘peace dividend’ of shared economic interests. So can debt dependence, where governments have borrowed higher sums than they can repay or even service, from foreign lenders and international financial institutions (IFIs). In 2005, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance Minister) Gordon Brown secured the agreement of his G7 colleagues to cancel the debts of the poorest nations to the World Bank and the IMF and to restructure other countries’ debts to the tune of \$200 billion. Sovereign debt has increased again since then and some donors may be using debt to assert influence over debtor countries.

This plays no part in UK policy which holds only 0.5% of Egypt’s sovereign debt but has invested £8.7 billion in FDI. Total trade in goods and services in 2024 amounted to a healthy £4.7 billion sterling, with UK exports representing £2.7 billion and Egypt’s exports to the UK to the value of £2 billion. Although the balance of trade is currently in the UK’s favour, the partners’ common economic interests provide a positive basis for a friendly and cooperative political relationship.



Mr. Robin Lamb is a Board Member of The Egyptian British Chamber of Commerce and Court Member of The British University in Egypt . He is a retired member of the British Diplomatic Service whose career culminated in appointments as HM Ambassador to Bahrain (2004-06) and HM Consul General in Basra (2006). His previous overseas postings alternated with appointments at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office in London where he held positions involving regional analysis, policy formation and a leadership role in government support for the UK’s global trade in services (including education). Apart from the latter, his career focused exclusively on the Middle East and North Africa region and included postings to Lebanon (for language training), Sudan, Libya, Saudi Arabia (twice), Oman, Kuwait (twice), Egypt (1993-96), Bahrain and Iraq.

Mr. Lamb studied Arabic language, literature and history at Oxford University. His other current appointments include Director General of the Libyan British Business Council, Board Member of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs and Member of the Advisory Board of the Cambridge Middle East & North Africa Forum.

¹ Cowater International New WTO Agreement is expected to facilitate investments, boost trade in developing countries - Cowater International

Student Research Paper

The Changing Dynamics of China-MENA Relations Post-2011: From Risk Aversion to Greater Engagement



By Farah Medhat, BUE Political Science Student, Degree year 3

Introduction

Historically, China's foreign policy toward the Middle East was characterized to a large degree by strategies of risk aversion and detachment from regional disputes. However, following the unexpected outbreak of the Arab revolutions of 2011, Chinese policymakers quickly came to the realization that the ongoing conflicts and growing instability in the region will seriously threaten its national and diplomatic interests, and thus, that its prior commitment to nonintervention will become increasingly taxing to maintain. Henceforth, China has become an influential actor and emerging power in Middle Eastern affairs, though only to the extent necessary to protect and promote its stakes in certain states. Thus, it may be argued, according to the system level of analysis, that three primary objectives provided the impetus for China's greater involvement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after the Arab Spring protests: firstly, economic interdependence; secondly, national security; thirdly, geopolitical interests. In the following analysis, two major dimensions of each of these determinants—along with some case studies—are examined in order: for the first determinant, oil resources and trade relations; for the second, regime continuity and counterterrorism; for the third, power competition and conflict management.

Economic Interdependence

Energy Security

Oil is the most pivotal element of interest-based Sino-Arab relations. In the post-Arab Spring period, Chinese dependency on Middle Eastern energy supplies has increased drastically. In late 2013, China replaced the United States as the largest oil importer and consumer in the world (Murphy, 2022). As of 2015, Arab states provided about 60% of China's oil usage imports (Evron, 2017, p. 126). Moreover, China's demand for oil resources is projected to rise exponentially in the near future, in accordance with the country's economic and population growth. Research predicts that China's energy demands will have increased by 130% by 2025 (Taylor, 2006) and that by 2030, about 80 percent of China's oil will come from the Middle East (Kaplan, 2014).

China's perpetual pursuit of energy security has thus made conflict and instability in the region a focal point of Chinese foreign policy. Armed conflict and rebellion can lead to fluctuation and increase in energy prices, or otherwise a shortage or interruption of energy supplies, something which puts China's growing economy at great risk. In 2013, Saudi Arabia became China's foremost trading partner and top exporter of crude oil following a decline in American-Saudi relations (Murphy, 2022). Similarly, Gulf states benefit from energy trade with China, as it is a long-term client of their natural gas resources, as well as their hydrocarbon and petrochemical products, two vital sources of economic growth for oil producing states (Karakır, 2022).

Trade Relations

Another key trigger for China's deeper engagement in the Middle East is its developing economic and trade relations with several regional states. Middle Eastern countries, especially oil-rich ones, also offer several important opportunities for the Chinese economy, including: foreign investments, non-oil trade, infrastructure, and construction projects (Ponížilová, 2019). Since China's anchoring power in the international arena is mostly economic in nature, Chinese decisionmakers recognized the importance of strengthening lucrative ties in the region after the eruption of the 2011 Arab uprisings—especially after China lost investments worth millions of dollars after civil unrest erupted in Libya and Syria (Ponížilová, 2019). To this end, China proclaimed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, which establishes the Middle East as a central player in an emerging international trade system connecting South and East Asia, Europe, and Africa due to its geographic location; Tehran has played a crucial role in this initiative (Horesh, 2016). Additionally, China's 2016 Arab policy paper highlights "mutual benefit and win-win results" as the foundation for Sino-Middle Eastern collaboration in the trade sector (Karakır, 2022, p. 245).

Beijing was also forced to contend with the newly established regimes in the MENA region in order to secure mutual benefits. A case in point is Egypt: given its great geopolitical significance, the presence of a large local consumer market for Chinese products and an equally valuable job market, maintaining economic relations with Egypt proved indispensable and China found itself compelled to provide generous financial aid to both governments under Mohamed Morsi and later, under President al-Sisi—regardless of ideological variance—in order to renew its alliance with the state (Chang, 2014). Examples of modern Sino-Arab trade relations also include bilateral and multilateral agreements with countries like Libya, Iran, and Syria over various imports and exports of arms, drones, and consumer goods (Olimat, 2012).

National Interests

Regime Continuity

In addition to the economic perils of the Arab Spring, the uprisings also evoked major security concerns for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which it had exerted the greatest effort to avoid. That is, Chinese policymakers worried gravely that the spirit of rebellion might echo among the Chinese people. Of particular concern were persecuted democratic groups and, more importantly, disaffected ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan who might find in the Arab awakening an ambitious plan of action to achieve their own territorial independence—this is amplified by preexisting cultural and religious ties between the Uyghur people and the Muslim states of the Middle East. (Olimat, 2012). Simultaneously, the two goals at the core of the CCP's national policy are: preventing Western, namely American, interference in its domestic matters; and maintaining sovereignty over Taiwan (Chen, 2008). However, in view of rising instability in the Middle East, these goals seemed rather distant. It was against this background of China's internal and external environment that the Chinese authorities sought to take greater measures in its foreign relations to demonize the revolutions. This is because they could not afford any perception of the Chinese state's stance on the Arab Spring to be anything but utter condemnation, recognising that that would compromise the legitimacy and continuity of the CCP's reign (Olimat, 2012).

China's vehement disapproval of the 2011 Arab protests both antagonized US interests in the region and jeopardized bilateral relations with Arab allies in the region; this has led to a general feeling of confusion and inconsistency toward Chinese foreign policy. This security dilemma culminated in China's fateful decision to effect—together with Russia—a double veto in February 2012 on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions on Syria which would have effected a Western-led regime change and the advancement of liberal values, human rights, and democratic practices (Horesh, 2016).



This thinly-veiled display of authoritarian solidarity was ascribed to international Westphalian norms of sovereignty and nonintervention; in reality, the Chinese government's active participation in the UNSC was an attempt to avoid unintentionally denouncing its own rule by failing to show support for fellow totalitarian states—as it once did by abstaining on the earlier UNSC Resolution 1973 on the Libyan crisis—and consequently, open the door for future Western and international interference in its native affairs (Ponížilová, 2019).

Counterterrorism

Another critical security issue that China had to face in the wake of the Arab revolutions of 2011 was the rise of political Islam in conjunction with terrorist groups. The subsequent collapse of hitherto secular, authoritarian regimes in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Iran and Libya had generated popular appeal for Islamist parties who proceeded to quickly seize power across the region. Chinese decisionmakers primarily feared the possibility that this radical ideology would be transported across Central Asian republics and result in the mobilisation of Muslim populations there, which would have serious ramifications on Chinese soil and the 20 million Muslims living there. An equally terrifying and likely prospect would be for Chinese foreign fighters to join the ranks of militant Islamist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and then continue to engage in and spread terrorist activities when they return home (Horesh, 2016).

Here, the case of Syrian terrorism serves as an adequate example. In China, Syria was labelled "a new Afghanistan" (p. 37). That is, in 2011, the country represented the first ever connection between local Uyghur separatist movements and the global terrorist network. China's fears were rapidly materialising as insurgents from Xinjiang as well as Chinese migrants living abroad moved to join international jihadist groups in Syria, intending to return eventually and pursue independence from the Chinese state. Moreover, Xinjiang saw a surge in terrorist attacks by the Pakistan-based Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) (Horesh, 2016) which damaged oil wells and pipelines, leading to a diminished energy supply (Ponížilová, 2019). In this manner, China's vested interest in counterterrorism and the de-internationalisation of the Uyghur cause is clearly and closely related to its unrelenting support for al-Assad's regime throughout the Syrian civil war and its fierce opposition to any US-imposed sanctions on the country (Olimat, 2012)—which would only exacerbate the conflict and accelerate the demise of the existing government; thus, China hopes to contain the spread of Islamist extremism.

Geopolitical Interests

Power Competition

Lastly, China's increased involvement in the MENA region after post-2011 can be further understood as a manifestation of the country's emergence as a competitive global power. According to Olimat (2012), China seems to be "treating matters related to the Arab Spring as part of its resistance to Western hegemony" (p. 102). That is, it is a protraction of the greater power struggle between the two countries, one where China's current role is largely a defensive one expressed in its many, ingenious attempts of undermining US interests in the Middle East, without advancing its own. This is evident in China's aforementioned obstruction of the United States' desired outcome in the UNSC resolutions, by which China gradually establishes itself as an independent actor seeking to tip the long-standing balance of power in the international system (Olimat, 2012). Several developments have provided the conditions that allow for this transition of power in the Middle East; however, the deciding factor was American and Western disengagement from the Greater Middle East, owing to increasing American energy independence as well as declining relations with Arab states, a phenomenon that began with the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Salman et al., 2015) and was catalysed by the 2011 Arab protests which put an end to most pro-Western governments in the region. Beijing has thus exploited this unprecedented leadership vacuum and stepped in to attempt to stabilise post-revolutionary states and further its own interests (Horesh, 2016). Some scholars predict that China's growing diplomatic relationships and security ties with certain regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia might help China realise its vision of a multipolar system, in which Westphalian mechanisms of dispute resolution are upheld (Horesh 2016).

However, while China may substitute for the United States as a great power in the MENA, it is imperative to note that China still refrains from any activity that would be considered a direct challenge to the United States' global hegemony. China does not have the adequate military capabilities to enter into war with the latter (Olimat, 2012), particularly that China continues to capitalise on American protection of shared sea-lanes for oil trade (Schenker, 2013). Part of the motivation for China's deeper engagement in the Middle East, as well as sub-Saharan Africa, also had to do with the United States' strategy of balancing away from the Middle East and toward the Asia-Pacific region which it perceives as a threat to its territorial hegemony in the South China and East China Seas and the so-called 'One China' policy (Murphy, 2022).

Conflict Management

Amidst growing tensions in the Middle East and the threat of war, the Chinese state recognized that some degree of interference in the conflict management strategies of the region is inevitable if it is

to maintain its rocketing economy. Compared to other dominant stakeholders in the MENA, the potential for a settlement of disputes orchestrated by China seems promising; this is due to two main reasons: the absence of a Chinese colonial history in the area; the objectivity and impartiality of China's foreign policy toward contesting actors and groups and its sponsored framework for peaceful conflict resolution (Karakir, 2022). Nevertheless, China's efforts thus far are of limited effectiveness, restrained in the first place by Beijing's unwillingness to take a more dominant position, for fear that it may disrupt its relationship with its partners in Washington (Horesh, 2016). In the meantime, China may be unable to effect any substantial progress in Middle Eastern conflicts; however, establishing itself as an honest and trustworthy ally to regional powers like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran can produce piecemeal developments toward the resolution of long-standing disputes.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, China's increased involvement in the Middle East after 2011 has been determined by a combination of pragmatic motives and a desire to play an important role in regional security. While it is understandable why making sure its access to resources and its economic interests are safe is important, there is much more that could be done in terms of its foreign policy. For instance, a more direct approach to foreign policy may be beneficial for China in the long run, one that seeks to address underlying issues and proactively promote constructive relations with its neighbours. This could involve taking a more active role in regional and international affairs and working to promote stability, security, and prosperity in the Middle East and beyond. Engaging with other nations on the basis of mutual friendship rather than purely economic concerns has the potential to build deeper relationships between them. Such an approach could have the potential to bring about far-reaching benefits for both China and other countries in the region in terms of trade, economic development, and security collaboration and could enable Chinese foreign policymakers to make much better use of their nation's diplomatic capabilities and influence which would further enhance their global standing.



About BUE

The formation of a British University in Egypt arose from a 1998 Memorandum of Cooperation between the UK and the Egyptian governments. It was envisaged that such an institution would produce graduates of UK standards for key sectors of the Egyptian economy, particularly in the areas of engineering, computer science and business studies. The BUE is a major University delivering Higher Education with Students graduating with both Egyptian and UK degrees. It is the largest face-to-face provision of British Transnational Higher Education in the Middle East, leading in Educational Quality, Student Experience, high research and focused enterprise. We have started since September 2005 and now our student population has reached 12000 thousand with 11 faculties. BUE is the first accredited Private University in QS Ranking. For more information, please visit our website: <https://www.bue.edu.eg/>

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Lubna Salama



The
BRITISH UNIVERSITY
IN EGYPT

The British University in Egypt (BUE)
Address: Suez Rd, El Sherouk City,
Cairo Governorate 11837, Egypt
Website: <https://www.bue.edu.eg/>
Hotline: +2019283

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