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Second Edition

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A Note from CEMES

Dear Readers,

A few months ago, we issued the first edition of CEMES, E-Journal. The success was immediate.

Our well-known global participants and contributors wrote excellent articles dealing with important international issues and problems. Their topics which were diverse, independent and rigorous, served as an important primary source of Knowledge for our students at BUE and the study community worldwide. We were proud to capitalize on the rich data base of BUE to share our E-Journal with more than 700 institutions, universities and thinks tanks around the world. Their reviews and E- letters of acknowledgments encouraged us to work further.

Please find below a sample of some of their acknowledgments and reviews.

H.E. Mr. RaphaelGrossi

**Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA,
Vienna**

“Congratulations. Excellent.”

.....

Professor Dr. Charles W. Kegley

**Founding partner of Kegley International, Inc. and Distinguished
Pearce Professor of International Relations Emeritus at the University
of South Carolina.**

“Excellent work, very proud.”

.....

H.E. Mr. Ahmed Abou Gheit

Secretary General of the League of Arab States, Cairo.

“Congratulations. Good Compilation and good work.”

.....

H.E Mr. Miguel Angel Moratinos

**The High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of
Civilizations (UNAOC).**

“Congratulations. Best of success to BUE and CEMES.”

Ambassador Dr. Mounir Zahran

Chair of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (EFCA), Cairo.

“It is with pleasure that I received your message regarding the 1st edition of the first quarterly electronic journal from the Centre for Middle East Studies (CEMES) at the British University in Egypt (BUE). It is indeed an outstanding academic platform of knowledge, gathering contributions from academia and personalities of various backgrounds and specializations. It is interesting to note that it gives also room for contributions from students, as an incentive to them to seek excellence in their studies and enhance competition among them. I wish to congratulate you for that achievement and express to you my best wishes for continued success.”

Mr. Li Dong

Minister Counsellor- Embassy of China in Egypt.

“Thank you very much for sending the CEMES Journal and congratulations for the establishment of the center and the publishing of the journal which is yet another important achievement for the BUE.”

Professor Yehia Bahei-El-Din

Acting President, The British University in Egypt.

“Thank you for sharing. Congratulations. Very impressive.”

Professor Safaa Hashim

Dean, Faculty of Nursing, The British University in Egypt.

“Thank you for your email and my sincere congratulations to you and the (CEMES) team on this innovative initiation. This endeavor is a springboard for a further tightening of the academic staff- students connection while providing a platform for junior creative minds of the students to find a room to share ideas and knowledge. On the academic level, it is a leap paving the way for a multidisciplinary thinking approach that would broaden the horizons of any who would read the magazine. On a further notice thank you for letting us know of the efforts of the BUE’s esteemed organizations like the (CEMES).

Thank you for sharing this achievement with us and waiting for the upcoming journal releases.”

Professor Dr. Omar H. Karam
Dean, Faculty of Informatics and Computer Science, The British
University in Egypt.

“Congratulations on this wonderful first issue and best wishes always.”

Professor Shadia Fahim
Dean, Faculty of Arts & Humanities, The British University in Egypt.

“Congratulations on the first issue of the CEMES Journal. It is an excellent initiative! This journal is certainly a valuable source of knowledge. Thank you for sharing and I look forward to receiving future issues of the journal.”

Six Impending Challenges to World Order

Prof. Charles W. Kegley Jr & Prof. Gregory A. Raymond



Following World War II, the United States used its unrivaled military and economic might to promote a liberal, multilateral, rules-based order, which eventually expanded across the globe after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Undeniably, there were many shortcomings to the rules and institutions that composed this international order. The world's most powerful states occasionally ignored its rules and often complained about its institutions. Sometimes they acted unilaterally, touting their commitment to international law and universal political rights while simultaneously intervening into the domestic affairs of other countries. All too often, liberal norms bowed to power politics. Nevertheless, when viewed in historical perspective, the rules and institutions of this admittedly flawed international order produced remarkable results: international trade soared, standards of living rose, lifespans increased, and wars between great powers receded.

Ironically, opposition to the principles and practices of this order eventually came from its architect and guarantor—the United States. The presidency of Donald J. Trump represented

a repudiation of the post-World War II international order. His brusque, impulsive, and clumsy approach to statecraft replaced the ideal of mutual collaboration with winner-take-all competition. Rather than engaging with other countries to work toward the common global good, he adopted myopic, heavy-handed policies that rejected the possibility of “win-win” outcomes in international negotiations. The blistering attacks that Trump launched against the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization, as well as his harsh rebuke of the Paris Climate Accord revealed a profound distaste for multilateralism at the very moment that the world faced problems that could not be addressed single-handedly.

Joseph R. Biden’s decisive victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential election does not mean a return to the world before Trump. The landscape of world politics today is different from that which existed just a few years ago. Unlike in the recent past, when the United States enjoyed a position of primacy and the **“Washington consensus”** on the importance of **democratic governance, open markets, and private enterprise** was widely accepted, the international system has moved toward a more dispersed distribution of power, with America’s rivals offering alternative models of global governance for humanity to consider. How the differences among these contending visions will be resolved is **uncertain**. While we cannot predict precisely what will happen in the future, it is worth considering some of the complex questions that would-be architects of twenty-first-century world order will have to address. The following **six questions are among the most important**.

1. Is another Nuclear Arms Race on the Horizon?

The tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War never escalated to war. One reason was the series of arms control agreements that the superpowers negotiated after the Cuban missile crisis. Prior to their face-off in October 1962, Washington and Moscow seemed trapped in an action-reaction cycle where each side increased its armaments in response to the other. Beginning with the 1963 Hotline Agreement, which established a direct communication system between their chief executives, they reached several agreements that slowed their arms race and reduced the risk of nuclear war.

Although government secrecy prevents an exact count, estimates suggest that at the height of the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union possessed a combined total of over 60,000 nuclear warheads. Owing to arms control treaties, nuclear stockpiles have

plummeted ever since. In 2010, presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that reduced each country's strategic arsenal to 1,550 deployed warheads but did not deal with low-yield tactical nuclear warheads. The treaty will expire in 2021 and, if not extended by the United States and Russia, for the first time in roughly half a century no limits will exist on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the two countries.

The American strategic arsenal consists of long-range bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad is scheduled to be upgraded at a cost of \$1.7 trillion over 30 years, with plans for the B-21 long-range stealth bomber to enter into service by



2025, the first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine by 2027, and a new intercontinental ballistic missile by 2030. Russia and China are modernizing their strategic forces, too. But under a strategy known as “escalate to de-escalate,” they have also deployed battlefield nuclear weapons. A limited nuclear escalation during a conventional military crisis, so their thinking goes, will be persuasive enough to convince an opponent to back down but not so threatening as to provoke all-out retaliation. Some American policymakers agree. According to the Trump administration's 2018 *Nuclear Posture Review*, the United States requires tactical nuclear weapons to bridge the gap between conventional and full-scale nuclear war and is developing a low-yield nuclear weapon known as the W76-2 to fulfill that need.

As these worrisome trends indicate, controlling nuclear weapons remain a vital component of world order. The question facing us today is whether the nuclear powers can set aside their mutual suspicions and take bold, decisive action to avert a dangerous new arms race.

2. Will Advances in Technology Weaken Normative Restraints on the Use of Force?

Automated warfare—a possibility created by developments in robotics and artificial intelligence—represents another problem for architects of world order. Intelligent autonomous weapons, which would operate without human supervision, could radically change how military force is used. Many people fear that national leaders are more likely to wage war if they do not have to put their troops in harm's way. Currently, China, Russia, and the United States are investing heavily in research on lethal autonomous systems, which range from aerial drones to terrestrial robots that could identify and engage targets using voice and facial recognition software. Computer scientists believe that in the years ahead autonomous systems will be able to collaborate on the battlefield without human input. Swarms of these small, relatively inexpensive intelligent machines, some defense analysts predict, would be able to overwhelm the large, expensive military platforms that the world's great powers currently rely upon.

Still another technological advance with complex implications pertains to quantum computers, which theoretically could perform computations in seconds that otherwise would take conventional computers years. Whoever develops a large-scale operational version of this technology will have the ability to break traditional cryptographic systems, giving that state a decisive military advantage.

Without commonly accepted guidelines to govern the use of this revolutionary technology, national leaders may redefine the legal concept of self-defense, wearing away normative restraints on preventive military action. In such a future world, launching a first-strike attack may be accepted as a better option than facing down a rival once this capability becomes operational.

3. Has Cyberwarfare Puts Sovereignty at Bay?

In the digital age, borders are no longer barriers. Hackers have the capacity to conduct surveillance, steal data, disseminate disinformation, and impair power grids, air traffic control systems, and anything else that is part of the so-called "Internet of Things." Sovereignty is now at bay, because no government has the control that states once maintained over their internal affairs.



Unimpeded by geography, online attacks can strike anyone's computers, extracting sensitive information, preventing access to networks, or compromising the integrity of an operating system by altering critical data. Since signs of a cyberattack may not appear until long after it was launched and meticulous forensic research is needed to attribute responsibility to the perpetrator, deterring attacks with threats of retaliation is not always a realistic possibility.

The cyberattack on Estonia during the Spring of 2007 highlights the problem of tailoring an effective response to this opaque form of conflict. Following a dispute with Russia over the removal of a statue in Tallinn honoring the Soviet army's enormous sacrifices during World War II, hackers attacked Estonian governmental, banking, and media websites. Estonia's foreign minister blamed Moscow and, as a NATO member, brought the attack to the alliance's attention. Though expressing concern, the rest of the alliance declined to interpret the incident as falling under their mutual security guarantee. They were not willing to risk military hostilities in the physical world when it was unclear what constituted aggression in the virtual world.

Small states are not the only ones that are vulnerable to cyberattacks. Great powers are at risk, too. Recent elections in Europe and the United States have demonstrated that Internet trolls have the capacity to flood social media with incendiary rumors and conspiracy

theories, which can be amplified by thousands of botnets that automatically repost the propaganda. While political analysts still debate how much influence this misinformation might have on any given election's outcome, one thing is clear: By eroding the longstanding legal distinction between peace and war, inexpensive, incessant, and inflammatory digital attacks provide fertile ground for the growth of a no-holds-barred cyberworld. As international competition increasingly takes place in the virtual world, it is imperative for a collective understanding to be reached about the limits of permissible behavior. Although almost everyone shares a common interest in protecting state sovereignty and preventing criminal and terrorist organizations from operating freely in the digital realm, national leaders have different visions of internet governance that diverge over questions of openness. Patient, exhausting diplomacy will be needed to add cybersecurity norms and institutions to the architecture of world order.

4. Should the Rules and Institutions of World Order Apply to outer Space?

Although the practice of colonization has faded, the age-old desire to acquire territory continues to

motivate many states, as seen by Russia's seizure of Crimea, China's conflict with neighboring states over maritime claims, and the efforts of various countries to control vast swaths of the Arctic. Beyond these terrestrial ambitions, the great powers have set their eyes on a new frontier—outer space.

All three great powers envision outer space as a domain that will become central to their military capabilities. Already they rely on satellites for communication, navigation, and surveillance. Protecting these vulnerable assets is essential for national security. During the Cold War, the Soviet



Union tested “space mines” that could disable a satellite by spraying it with shrapnel. Today anti-satellite missiles have been developed by China, Russia, India, and the United States that not only can destroy satellites in low orbit but also threaten those in higher geosynchronous orbits. When U.S. President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983, which would put lasers and particle-beam weapons in space, many defense experts scoffed at the idea. The technology simply did not exist. However, computing power has increased exponentially since Reagan's day, and research on sensors and directed-energy weapons has also advanced considerably, which raises a host of new problems for controlling armaments.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibited placing nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth, banned such weapons from being stationed deeper in space, and declared that the Moon and other celestial bodies should be used for peaceful purposes. Beyond these preliminary injunctions, little progress has been made on developing a code of conduct for spacefaring nations, which in practice are routinely ignored. Meanwhile, plans are being drawn up in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington to establish bases on the Moon and to travel to and even populate Mars. According to retired U.S. Air Force General Steven L. Kwast, China is on a path to develop

nuclear propulsion technology and solar power stations in space within a decade, giving it the ability to beam clean energy to anyone on Earth and the capacity to disable another country's power grid. As the ambitions of the great powers in space continue to grow, the prospects for friction multiply and the stakes become more consequential.

5. Will Mercantilist Trade Wars Exacerbate Political Friction?

Since military coercion can backfire, states have often used economic statecraft to influence other countries. Beyond offering incentives like

economic aid, the arsenal of economic strategies also includes the option to implement sanctions, such as placing tariffs and quotas on imports from a targeted state, boycotting its products, refusing to sell it raw materials or manufactured goods, and freezing its financial assets.

Economic sanctions have a checkered history, however. Slow and often ineffective, they mainly serve a symbolic function by publicizing the target country's unacceptable behavior to foreign and domestic audiences. Nevertheless, national leaders frequently tout tariffs and import quotas as a way to protect domestic companies from foreign competition, even though protectionist barriers to imports may incite debilitating trade wars. The Smoot Hawley Act of 1930, for example, increased U.S. tariffs significantly and, in so doing, triggered a series of retaliatory measures by former American trade partners, which contributed to the collapse of global commerce. Protectionist measures, such as those favored by Donald Trump, repudiate the post-World War II liberal economic order that was painstakingly built, step by step, through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, later, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Rules and institutions that promote transparency, reciprocity, and nondiscrimination worked. Global trade expanded, as did the wealth of participating nations.

To be sure, the benefits of free trade were never evenly distributed; some countries' economies grew faster than others. This was especially true of China, whose president, Xi Jinping, boasted that his country's aggregate national wealth would exceed that of the United States by the year 2025, and that China would outstrip America in technology soon thereafter. In response, the Trump administration imposed high tariffs on Chinese imports to the United States, to which China, predictably, responded in kind.

Trump's reaction was based on neomercantilism—the economic nationalist theory that maintaining a balance-of-trade surplus by reducing imports, stimulating domestic production,

and promoting exports increases a state's prosperity and power in comparison to its economic competitors. His emphasis on relative rather than absolute gains reveal why a world order that promises mutual economic benefits can encounter stiff resistance if one or more great powers believe that benefits realized by one side come at the expense of the other.

If the foregoing concerns were not disturbing enough, even more menacing threats complicate efforts to preserve world order.

The scientific consensus today is that:

6. Will Climate Change, Ecological Crises, and Pandemics mobilize Collective Efforts to Preserve the World Order?

- (1) the earth is warming,
- (2) human activities are a principal cause,
- (3) they are affecting the planet's climate, and
- (4) the impact is substantial.


Where climatologists disagree is over how rapidly things are changing and whether the planet is approaching a "tipping point,"

where small increases in temperature could suddenly cause catastrophic effects. If the earth's surface temperature continues to climb, ice caps and glaciers will melt, sea levels will rise, low-lying coastal land, including cities and islands throughout the world, will flood, oceans will become more acidic as they absorb carbon dioxide, extreme weather events such as hurricanes, draughts, and wildfires will become more severe, and tropical diseases will spread to previously temperate regions that were formerly too cold for their insect carriers. In short, climate change will shatter economies, jeopardize health, and trigger civil strife.

Also injurious to human well-being are biodiversity loss and land degradation. The world has entered a period of environmental instability likely to cause widespread dislocation. Unless biodiversity is preserved and land protected, the impact could be both dramatic and devastating, imperiling humanity for a future too grim to contemplate. No country will be immune, and only through their cooperation can humanity bring the growing multifaceted threats to world order under control.

Nothing illustrates the vulnerability of a borderless, interdependent world better than the impact of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), which at the time of this writing has infected over 50 million people worldwide. With a mortality rate estimated to be as high as 3.4%, Covid-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, has been responsible for more than 1.2 million deaths

and the most severe contraction in the global economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s. With production slowing, supply chains disrupted, demand falling, and unemployment soaring as national governments lock down their economies, the pandemic has fueled calls for protectionism under the guise of national self-reliance. Paradoxically, at the same time that the rapid and relentless spread of Covid-19 demonstrates that international collaboration is essential for fending off the virus, the economic carnage caused by the virus may erode support for maintaining the liberal international economic order.



The Perilous Path Ahead

Nation-states are sovereign. With no higher authority to regulate their behavior, they must fend for themselves. In an anarchic environment, relying upon self-help to defend one's interests is understandable. Uncertain about the intentions of others, national leaders count on arms and alliances for security rather than on the good will of potential adversaries.

Yet this does not mean that world politics is pure mayhem. Most national leaders recognize that their interests are served by having rules that spell out the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy, and institutions devised to induce restraint when and where ground rules break down. However, no blueprint exists for constructing these rules and institutions. Every national leader has his or her own ideas about what is desirable. Sometimes their ideas differ, fueling bitter disagreements and political deadlock; occasionally they intersect, prompting hard bargaining to reach a consensus on what behavior is appropriate under certain specific circumstances; and at other times they converge, laying the foundation for a commonly accepted framework that specifies the permissible goals and instruments of foreign policy.

In other words, ordering rules and institutions do not arise automatically. They are the products of visionary statecraft and persistent diplomacy. While the six questions discussed above do not encompass all of the salient issues on the global agenda, they highlight some of the most important. The task now facing the international community is how to build an order that addresses these challenges. Crafting a framework of rules and institutions that are resilient and accepted as legitimate has never been so difficult.

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Internetization of Developing countries

By Professor Constantine E. PASSARIS



New Global Economy

The new global economy of the 21st century has transformed the economic, social, and political landscape in a profound and indelible manner. Never before in human history has the pace of structural change been more pervasive, rapid, and global in its character. The new economy has become a catalyst for geopolitical symbiosis, economic integration, trade liberalization, technological change, and financial interconnectedness.

The new economy is composed of a trilogy of interactive forces that include internetization, trade liberalization and the information technology and communications revolution. Internetization has melted national borders and redefined economic policy. Free trade has enhanced global economic integration and extended the economic architecture. The Information Technology (IT) Revolution has made geography and time irrelevant. All these pillars of the new economy are driven by a virtually borderless world with a tremendous capacity for electronic connectivity (Passaris, 2014).

The advent of the new economy has resulted in the fundamental restructuring of the economy and civil society. Electronic interconnectedness is the glue that holds the contemporary global economy together. Furthermore, the new economy is built on a culture of innovation with an emphasis on business creativity and global outreach. Indeed, the signature mark of the new global economy is new ideas, new technologies and new initiatives.

The economic profile of the new global economy can be summarized as the global integration of economies through trade and investment flows as well as the internationalization of the production of goods and services. This economic profile also includes the formation of global corporations and global networks. In addition, we should note the widespread internationalization of all forms of economic activity in production, marketing, consumption, capital, standards, and tastes. The new global economy has also resulted in the rapid growth in intra-firm and intra-network trade of components and sub-assemblies as well as finished products and services leading to a much higher level of economic specialization (Passaris, 2006).

The new economy has become truly global in scope and substance. Furthermore, it serves as a catalyst for the reorientation of large-scale production in high wage economies from economies of scale to economies of scope. It has contributed to the shortening of production cycles, placing a high premium on innovation, product quality and niche marketing. The new economy has also witnessed the rapid growth and diffusion of services and knowledge-intensive activities, for both products and processes. It has also precipitated the outsourcing of labor-intensive methods of production to low wage developing countries.

The new global economy is driven by technological change and financial liberalization and sustained by an appreciation among policy makers that an open and rules-based international trading and financial system is essential to global economic progress. The free flow of capital, labour, goods and services within free trade regions, the development of new financial instruments and institutions, and the instantaneous access to information and communication through new digital networks, have created a fully integrated global economic system of tremendous scope and opportunity. In short, the new global economy has achieved a higher level of international economic interdependence and linkages than ever before.



Internetization Ascending

Internetization is a new word and concept that I have coined to describe the electronic empowerment of the new global economy of the 21st century. My operational definition of internetization is that it consists of two interactive forces. These are global outreach and electronic connectivity. The birth of the concept of internetization is associated with a moment of intellectual serendipity. It was coined to replace the word globalization which has become an anachronism. There is nothing new about the concept of globalization. In fact, the practice of globalization has been a permanent fixture in humanity's journey since time immemorial. World


history reveals that global linkages between countries and societies have existed through trade, military conquest, colonization, and cultural outreach for a very long time (Passaris, 2017).

Over its lengthy lifespan, the concept of globalization has accumulated a considerable amount of negative scholarly baggage. Furthermore, it does not project the empowerment of electronic connectivity which is a foundational feature of the new global economy of the 21st century. In consequence, the word globalization lacks currency on the contemporary intellectual and economic landscape. Globalization is a throwback to a previous age prior to electronic connectivity and with more limited means of information accessibility and rapid communication. Indeed, the word globalization has passed its best-before date.

The new word internetization was constructed from the foundational role of the Internet that serves as the catalyst that empowers global connectivity. To my way of thinking, internetization includes global linkages and extends them by simultaneously embracing electronic connectivity and the empowerment of the Internet. In short, internetization is globalization on steroids. Furthermore, internetization captures the pervasive influence of technological change and electronic innovations on the global economy and all aspects of human endeavor for civil society in the 21st century. In consequence, internetization combines the concept of globalization with the contemporary relevance of the IT Revolution of the late 20th century. The IT Revolution has transformed international outreach by improving the connectivity between people and places and leading to a collapse of the physical barriers of geographical distance. In short, internetization is a more appropriate modern and improved descriptor for the contemporary transformational change precipitated by the spectacular technological innovations of our time. The new word internetization has gained academic integrity and currency with academic scholars judging by the number of times it has been cited in academic journals and scholarly articles. Furthermore, this new term was selected as one of the six most important predictions to watch in 2019 by Top Rank Marketing's Top SEO Predictions & Trends for 2019 (TopRank Marketing, 2018).

North South Divide

The severity and extent of the COVID-19 global economic impact is most acutely understood in the context of a comparison between developed and developing countries. Indeed, the global coronavirus pandemic has revealed a macroeconomic inconvenient truth. It has widened the economic disparity between developed and developing countries. In effect, the economic impact, and consequences of COVID-19 on a global scale have been uneven and asymmetric. COVID-19 has underlined the disparity in economic opportunity and economic performance between two opposites in the form of the economic status quo for developed and developing countries. This disparity has



been magnified as a result of the digital divide which is reflected in the lack of electronic infrastructure and digital capacity in developing countries.

The role of internetization in our contemporary economic and social existence is most vividly displayed when we compare the empowering role of electronic connectivity between developed and developing countries. It has revealed a compelling contemporary explanation for the economic divide between North and South. In the 20th century, developed countries invested and provided their citizens with physical connectivity through roads, planes, railroads, and sea-faring vessels. In the 21st century, developed countries refocused their investment streams towards IT infrastructure and digital capacity. In contrast, developing countries have lagged developed countries with respect to investments in both physical and digital capacity. On both counts, physical and IT infrastructure remains a work in progress for developing countries.

A global comparative assessment reveals that civil society in developed countries is significantly better off than most of the world's population. Despite the adverse economic consequences inflicted by the coronavirus pandemic, citizens of developed countries had recourse to a financial support system and a social safety net that is superior or even non-existent in developing countries around the world. More specifically, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, only developed countries were able to rely on the security and dependability of a well-oiled machinery of economic governance, a national financial support system to come to the assistance of their citizens and businesses during hard times and a fairly robust health care system. These were luxuries that were not available to the citizens of the developing world who number more than 6.5 billion people or 85 % of the world's population.

One of the stark comparisons between developed and developing countries appeared during the re-opening of the national economies and the gradual removal of social confinement. The process of reopening national economies around the world after a period of extreme economic and social lockdowns has created unique asymmetric challenges. In the post COVID-19 world, most of the developed countries implemented a gradual and cautious re-opening of their economies taking their cue from a declining trend in coronavirus infections. That was not an option for most developing countries.

Developing economies did not have the luxury of time on their side, since they faced a different set of realities and challenges. A prolonged lockdown for developing countries brought to the fore a binary choice between saving lives and protecting livelihoods. Due to their weak social safety net, food insecurity, inadequate institutional framework, developing countries concluded that many more people would die from hunger than from the infectious virus. In consequence, they were prepared to gamble with a surge in infections because of a quick reopening and avoid the possibility of mass starvation.



Policymakers in developing countries concluded that a prolonged lockdown would cause more long-term financial harm and result in more deaths than reopening their economies immediately. Furthermore, governments in developing countries did not have an effective outreach in the form of electronic connectivity to a large segment of the population, especially those who are street

vendors, rickshaw pullers, and the most vulnerable who have low or no savings and live in shanty towns. In this case, the lack of a social media presence and the absence of an electronic network inflicted an additional penalty for developing countries. In short, the marginalized portion of the workforce was forced to bear the brunt of a disproportionate adverse financial impact because of a prolonged economic lockdown.

For developing countries, the cruelest part of the decision to determine the appropriate COVID-19 economic strategy was quantifying which lives matter the most and initiating public policies to save them. This rationale loses sight of the social and cultural value of human lives and it becomes an economic choice between two bad outcomes in the form of a prolonged economic shut-down or a quick reopening. Opting in favour of the one that incurs the lower number of economic casualties. For many marginalized citizens in developing countries, the harsh and immediate measures of a comprehensive lockdown felt like an economic ambush with respect to their economic livelihoods. It also revealed a deep internal fissure in their respective societies between those who had the financial means to sustain themselves during the lockdown and those who did not. Furthermore, the economic consequences of labor disruptions were particularly acute because of the lack of a digital infrastructure and electronic capacity in developing countries. For example, in developing countries working from home through electronic connectivity was not a viable economic option. In addition, COVID-19 caused the abrupt closure of international borders. In consequence, it resulted in the instant decimation of the tourism and hospitality industries in developing countries.

COVID-19 reminded us that in a globalized world, no one is immune from the medical, economic, and social consequences of the pandemic. The advent of internetization has revealed that national borders are more porous and malleable than before. Developing countries faced with those dire economic constraints and consequences have made a strong case for financial assistance from developed countries. More precisely, the financial assistance would be in the form of a global financial aid package that will serve as a business recovery plan. Indeed, some economists have advocated for a 21st century “Marshall Plan” that will cushion the disastrous economic consequences for developing countries from this global pandemic and assist them to resume their economic development trajectories. The reason being that the sooner the developing countries can get out of their economic downward tailspin, the sooner they can open their domestic markets for trade with developed countries.

At the end of the day, the slogan **“we are all in this together”** is not simply an aspirational outcome but an economic objective. As COVID-19 has spread around the world, it has exposed our collective weaknesses, fault lines and vulnerabilities on the economic landscape. If COVID-19 is present somewhere, it is a potential threat everywhere. Our effective global response to COVID-19 should take to heart the message that a global society is only as strong as its weakest link. And sometimes it takes a crisis for everyone to see the inequalities that were there all along.

Economic Development

Economic development has been a central theme for the discipline of economics. Over the years, economists have promoted a variety of economic development models for the purpose of fostering and nurturing economic growth in developing countries and bridging the gap of economic prosperity between developed and developing countries. Indeed, several economic development models in the post-World War II period had as their primary purpose to create the fundamentals for economic growth and development in developing countries. This journey has manifested itself in the theoretical evolution of a variety of economic development models. Important mileposts associated with economic development models since World War II have focused on fostering industrialization or enhancing trade liberalization. All of this with the ultimate objective of finding a potent economic development model that will bridge the economic disparity between developed and developing countries.

The shared objective in all those economic development models was to propose a theoretical template for developing countries that would assist them in attaining the level of economic maturity and prosperity that was enjoyed by developed countries. In this journey, economic development models have offered a diversity of theoretical approaches and operational strategies. These range from investing in industrialization to embracing trade liberalization. In assessing the efficacy of these economic development models with respect to their success in bridging the economic disparity between developed and developing countries, they have been profoundly unsuccessful.

For most developing countries, the process of industrialization was anemic and did not contribute a pronounced positive impact with respect to economic prosperity and economic development. It failed to break the vicious cycle of dependence on natural resources as the economic driver for the national economies of developing countries. Subsequent scenarios and blueprints for enhancing economic development in developing countries did not fare any better. Indeed, developing countries continue to face economic despair about not sharing in the economic benefits of the new global economy especially through trade liberalization.

Economists have persistently advocated the benefits of international trade. Adam Smith referred to the concept of absolute advantage in international trade in 1776 and David Ricardo introduced his theory of comparative advantage in 1817. Since then, students of economics have been taught the benefits of international trade based on an export-led growth model. These economic benefits bestow direct gains to consumers, businesses, and governments. More precisely, consumers get access to a wider choice of products at lower prices and better quality. Businesses expand their market share, achieving economies of scale and improving their profits. And international trade empowers governments to grow the economy, reduce unemployment and improve the standard of living of their citizens.

One of the pillars of the new global economy of the 21st century is trade liberalization. However, there is a sweeping apprehension that trade liberalization has not measured up to the expectations of developing countries. It has not bridged the gap of economic opportunity and personal prosperity between developed and developing countries. In some cases, the disparity in economic well-being has widened instead of shrinking. In effect, developing countries feel shortchanged by the rules of economic engagement, the terms of trade, and the contemporary

supply chains. The reason being that the benefits of international trade depend on leveraging a country's competitive advantage. In the contemporary fiercely competitive international economic environment, marginalized and disenfranchised developing countries can very easily become sidelined in the pursuit of lucrative trade deals.




Trade liberalization has spawned a plethora of free trade agreements between developing and developed countries. However, developing countries have not always been the direct beneficiaries from these free trade agreements. In practice, a free-trade agreement is simply an economic opportunity. It is not a guarantee of economic success. It opens the door for enhanced trade opportunities with other

countries that did not exist prior to the agreement. What transforms this economic opportunity into an economic and business success story is the vision and strategy of domestic entrepreneurs, the productivity of the workforce as well as the competitiveness and quality of the products and services that are being traded. In consequence, free trade has not delivered the anticipated economic panacea for developing countries.

COVID-19 has spotlighted the foundational role and the economic efficacy of internetization as an enabler of economic growth and development. In this regard, there is an important lesson for developing countries seeking a modern pathway to economic development and bridging the gap between developed and developing countries. This modern pathway rests with embracing internetization as an important enabler for economic success in the context of the new global economy of the 21st century. It foretells a new opportunity and a hitherto unknown variable for serving as a catalyst and a driver of economic development. In other words, internetization offers a unique opportunity to spawn a new operational tool for economic development that is congruent with the digital empowerment of the contemporary economic landscape. In effect, I am proposing a new economic blueprint that has internetization as a core enabler for bridging the economic disparity between the North and South divide. All of this for the purpose of achieving economic prosperity and development in developing countries.

I believe, internetization is the most potent modern tool for addressing the disparity between developed and developing countries. Furthermore, internetization can serve as a catalyst for bridging the disparity in economic opportunity between developed and developing countries.

Internetization can empower developing countries to establish global virtual markets, enhance productivity, create a level playing field for educational opportunities, and contribute to the formation of human capital. It should be noted that internetization and the new global economy has shifted the emphasis for the wealth of nations from the resources under our feet to the resources between our ears. In consequence, the creation of human



capital within a country's population and workforce would define an effective modern trajectory towards attaining economic growth and prosperity for developing countries.

In short, internetization has the potential to become the great equalizer between developed and developing countries in modern circumstances. Indeed, COVID-19 has forced us to recognize that electronic connectivity has become an essential economic enabler for the 21st century like electricity and the combustion engine were for previous centuries. However, the lynch pin in the strategic positioning of internetization for the purpose of empowering developing countries and bridging the gap of economic disparity rests with addressing the digital divide.

The digital divide refers to the lack of electronic hardware and software as well as **the digital infrastructure in developing countries**. There can be no pathway for economic development in developing countries without an investment in digitalization that will result in a **readily available and affordable digital ecosystem in developing countries**. To date, the transition for developing countries to the **Age of Internetization** is neither preordained nor seamless. In fact, developing countries are confronted with a myriad of obstacles in making the transition to the **Age of Internetization**. Foremost, among those obstacles is the unavailability or the underutilization of the digital infrastructure and electronic capacity.

Conclusion

In the Chinese language, the word for crisis is composed of two characters. One denotes danger and the other opportunity. This is the context for an examination of the economic impact of COVID-19. More than 1 million people have died from the coronavirus worldwide. There is no denying that the coronavirus global pandemic has permeated shock and awe around the world. It has generated an adverse economic tsunami far and wide. But it can also be perceived as a new opportunity and an operational turning point for writing a new chapter in the global discourse regarding the scope and substance of economic development. In effect, the COVID-19 economic crisis has opened the door to reshape and restructure the economic landscape so that it can better serve humanity.

In this paper, we have recorded the ascent of the Age of Internetization and its foundational role in serving as a catalyst for global outreach and electronic connectivity in the new global economy of the 21st century and the modern social profile of civil society. We have also acknowledged the growing economic disparity between developed and developing countries because of the COVID-19 global pandemic. Finally, we have noted the cushioning effect of internetization on developed countries because of their digital capacity and electronic connectivity and at the same time the marginalizing impact of COVID-19 on developing countries and the widening of the economic divide because of their lack of IT infrastructure and electronic capacity.

COVID-19 has reminded us that we are living through one of the most momentous economic revolutions of all time. An economic revolution associated with a spectacular digital empowerment of unprecedented magnitude. The IT Revolution has spawned the operational axiom of internetization which has become a foundational postulate of the new global economy of the 21st century. Indeed, internetization has morphed into a modern catalyst for transformational change with a profound and indelible impact.

In the pages above we have analyzed the micro and macro-economic consequences of the global pandemic which has underlined the fault lines and asymmetric impact of COVID-19 between developed and developing countries. More specifically, we have highlighted the disparity in economic opportunity and economic performance between polar opposites in developed and developing countries. In effect, internetization has magnified the economic disparity between developed and developing countries because of COVID-19 and more precisely due to the lack of information technology infrastructure and digital capacity in developing countries.

The adverse economic consequences of COVID-19 have forced us to rethink and reimagine the operational parameters for economic development. This exercise has revealed new opportunities for bridging the gap of economic disparity between developed and developing nations. Digital education and online learning have the potential to serve as the great equalizer for developing countries by empowering them to create the human capital that is essential for their economic advancement in the 21st century. In addition, A second novel idea that is proposed in this paper is an economic blueprint and pathway for developing countries that is enabled by internetization. At the end of the day, COVID-19 has revealed a new path forward and an innovative economic strategy for enhancing the economic potential of developing countries in the context of the challenges and opportunities associated with the advent of the new global economy of the 21st century.

The operational role of the UFM in initiating social-economic Development in the Mediterranean region in addition to promoting peaceful conflict resolutions.



By Dr. Ahmed Masa'deh

Dear BUE ians,

If you visit the site of the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) which was founded July 13th, 2008, and has a membership of 42 member states from Europe and the Mediterranean Basin: the 27 EU member states and 15 Mediterranean partner countries namely Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Palestine, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, you will get the following explanation: "The Mediterranean region has largely contributed to the promotion of coexistence of cultures and religions in history. Between both the Northern and Southern shores, communities and cultures have always exchanged ideas, trade and learning together. This shared history has forged the creation of robust networks and our region has evolved with its characteristic diversity. The Barcelona Process was launched in 1995 with the aim of strengthening such relations between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean countries. This expression of good faith and the recognition that closer ties were in everyone's interest would later lead to the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM)."

During these 25 years, hundreds of initiatives have served as examples of this commitment in action. From large scale international projects to local initiatives, a consolidated network of cooperation has gradually developed and directly impacted the lives of millions of citizens."



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"I was proud to be the Secretary General of this organization".

Let me start by saying that the UFM Secretariat was created in Barcelona in 2010 serving as the operational institution that empowers the regional dialogue among the UFM Member States and stakeholders, fostering synergies and coordination among them and promoting regional projects and initiatives with a direct impact on the lives of the citizens. The Mediterranean region has always been the cradle of Civilizations, the birthplace of religions and the incubator of Great Traditions. The great history of this region has led to frequent conflicts and disturbances, some of which still exist till now. Globalization has caused more challenges and it is imperative that we collaborate together not only as governments but also among the legislative authorities and civil societies towards ending all disputes and embracing the diversity of the region in order to achieve integration without losing one's identity. Here comes the role of the UFM and the UFM Secretariat in particular as an added value that aims at establishing effective socio-economic projects in the Euro-Mediterranean area in the fields of Energy, Transport, Water, Pollution Control, Higher Education, Research, Civil protection and the development of small- medium enterprises which by turn strengthen the partnership between all parties and enhance regional dialogue to find realistic resolutions for the conflicts in the region. The core of what I have mentioned earlier is to refer to the positive impact of the economic interaction and integration on the political process and vice versa. if there is a stumbling block on the political front, the overall efforts of the UFM would be negatively affected; therefore, political breakthrough in the region would cement the role of the UFM.

Within this framework, we must say that the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Palestinian case which is the essence of this conflict hinders the economic integration in the region and that all relevant parties should terminate the stalled negotiations and resume the peace talks within a specific timeframe to reach a final settlement through establishing the Palestinian State, preserving Israel's Security and achieving peace on the Syrian and Lebanese Fronts.



In this context, we need to incorporate a new approach. So, the General Secretariat of the UFM should implement a number of sustainable development projects that aims at building trust and confidence building measures in the region and reinforcing the peacebuilding efforts. In accordance with this, I as SG have selected six representatives among them is one from Palestine and another from Israel to work together towards accomplishing this target and to assist me in my tasks as SG.

I am fully aware of the scope of challenges and the difficulties that we are facing in the region and I don't underestimate them. The UFM itself has faced many challenges which still exist up until now. My ambition is to implement regional projects which are visible and that are likely to have a direct impact on the citizens of the region on the socio-economic level in a peaceful and civilized ambience. If we succeed in doing so, our citizens and societies will fully support those projects and face all the obstacles to end all disputes and conflicts. Accordingly, the role of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary will be highly praised and acknowledged. For a further and an in-depth study please visit the website of the UFM and read its projects, aims and accomplishments. The UFM also offers training to students which is worthy of reading and applying for.

Interview with Honorary Speaker of the Senate of Belgium Dr. Jacques Brotchi



How did a noted Neurosurgeon enter Politics?

I did enter politics by the invitation from our Belgian Foreign Minister in 2004, H.E. Louis Michel. He convinced me that I could bring to politics my medical experience and knowledge of Belgian health system, so as the ones from many foreign countries I have visited during my neurosurgical career as teacher and/or president of the World Federation of Neurosurgical Societies. I have accepted to enter politics at the condition to be able to stay in my field of experience and not to run after topics in which I had no expertise. That was the deal which has been fully respected by my party (Mouvement Réformateur, MR) during my 15 years sitting in the Senate.

How can you describe your Senatorial Membership Experience?

Before 2014, the Senate was on the same level with the Chamber of Deputies. After 2014, the role of the Senate was focused on the power to confirm or reject any proposal to modify the Constitution. Always in the federal logic, the Senate intervenes in the possible conflicts of interest between the various parliamentary assemblies of the country. Thanks to the representatives they have delegated to the Senate, the federated entities have access to international parliamentary organizations. Like the other parliamentary assemblies, the Belgian Senate ensures that the European Union does not take any initiative on a subject which would be better dealt with at another level. This is the subsidiarity test. Finally, the Senate takes part in a series of appointments within high jurisdictions (Constitutional Court, Council of State, Superior Council of Justice).

What is the most important accomplishment by your Senate in your view?

To reject any law proposal which could split Belgium through any article of the Constitution.

People in Belgium fear division, do you think that this could happen?

Yes, it remains a risk but after a few years of splitting some topics between different parliaments, like health care for example, there is a trend to come back to more responsibilities to the federal state. In my opinion, no division will happen but maybe that the future of Belgium could move to a federation like Germany, Switzerland or the United States of America.

How is Belgium dealing with Covid 19 and will you take the vaccine?

Belgium has been deeply affected by Covid 19. We were in need of masks, protection clothes, and the virus has contaminated a great number of elderly and middle-aged people suffering from additional and acute illnesses. On the other hand, the reaction of the health care system was remarkable. In one week, the number of intensive care beds was doubled and everybody had open access to hospitals. Unfortunately, the number of deceased people was high after the first wave. Severe political decisions have been taken following the advice of medical experts. At present time, we face the second wave with an increase of cases but the situation is under control but we are afraid that after Christmas and New Year celebration the number of contaminations increase. However, we are no more in need of anything and we are preparing the arrival of vaccines. About myself, I shall take the vaccine which is the only hope we have to win the battle against the pandemic.

Belgian Senate role vis a vis the Arab-Israeli Conflict and 2 state solutions?

Belgian senate will support any two states solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I have great hope in such a solution, with the help of the majority of Arab countries among which the number having decided to make peace with Israel is in increase. I also hope that Europe will invest in such a future. Of course, there is a need for mutual recognition. How could you discuss with somebody who says that you don't exist? We need to support a two-state solution accepted by both parties. For a long time, the two-state solution seemed the only one capable of ending the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Today, partly under pressure from US diplomacy, another one-state solution encompassing both communities appear to be gaining ground. What is your analysis? - Personally, I am against a one-state solution. Moreover, the resolution passed in 1947 at the UN was very clear: Palestine, as it existed under the British mandate, was divided into two states: the state of Israel and the independent Palestinian state. Sadly, the Arab powers of the time did not accept this resolution and started a war.

How can you describe your relationship to Egypt, visit to Egypt 2008... etc.?

Egypt is a beautiful country where I have been several times, either for tourism or on official visit. I had the chance to make the cruise on the Nile, in the nineties, with my family. We have discovered Cairo, the Pyramids, Luxor, Abou Simbel and also very kind people everywhere. In 2008, I went to the scientific congress organized in Sharm-el-Sheik by the Egyptian Society of Neurosurgery. At that time, I was the president of the World Federation of Neurosurgical Societies and, during my 4-year mandate, I have brought my deepest support to the Egyptian Society and to Egyptian neurosurgeons with whom I have kept personal ties. And last but not least, during that official travel, I had the honour to meet H.E. Mrs. Mubarak and discuss with her about neurosurgery in Egypt. Finally, I must also say that in Belgium, as senator, I had official so as personal and excellent relationship and friendship with the Ambassadors of Egypt to Belgium H.E. Ambassador Dr. Mahmoud Karem.

Fatima Hussein- BUE Student

Arbitration and Inter-state Territorial Disputes: Assessing its Effectiveness in 'Conflict Resolution'



Arbitration is one of the contested mechanisms for conflict resolution. Despite the fact that arbitration has successful record in ending many territorial conflicts, it is believed to be the least utilized mechanism in resolving conflicts compared to other non-legal binding mechanisms (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). In this regard, the purpose of the paper is to assess the effectiveness of arbitration in 'conflict resolution'. The paper argues that the effectiveness of arbitration as a mechanism of conflict resolution is conditioned by the nature of the conflict, as arbitration had proved ineffective in resolving highly politicized value-based territorial conflicts for the reasons of: firstly, disputants' unwillingness to compromise, and secondly, the legal confined nature of Arbitration. Accordingly, the paper is divided into four sections. The first defines some main concepts as 'Conflict resolution' and 'arbitration'. The second section overviews the arbitration process setting down a theoretical foundation. The third section then reviews the literature on the effectiveness of arbitration, starting with a first camp of scholars who perceived arbitration as an effective mechanism, passing by the second camp who perceive it as ineffective and a third camp who argued that its effectiveness is conditioned. The fourth section then assess the effectiveness of arbitration through two case studies. The first is the Rann of Kutch case 1968, and the second is the Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute. While arbitration proved to be effective in the former due to apolitical and historical dimensions of the conflict, it showed less efficiency in the latter due to its mere legality and the nationalist emotional dimensions that affects disputants' willingness to compromise (Tesfay, 2012).

Conceptual Framework

Conflict Resolution: conflict resolution refers to the process where the adversaries, willingly, resort to certain mechanisms to solve the issue of contradiction, accept the existence of one another and most notably ends all forms of violence (Wani, 2011). It is necessary here to differentiate between conflict resolution and other interrelated concepts. For instance, conflict management refers to a process that aims at minimizing the use of violence and mitigating the intensity of the conflict by reaching a settlement temporarily (Gartnet, 2014). 'Conflict prevention' is a way to prevent the escalation of disputes from becoming deep violent conflicts. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, is not about controlling nor preventing certain disputes but rather it is a process of larger objective which is achieving levels of rapprochement between the two adversaries that paves the way for peaceful future interactions (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2012). Given these differences between the three concepts, the purpose of the paper here is to assess the effectiveness of arbitration in 'conflict resolution' as a higher process than management and prevention.

Arbitration: It is one of the binding mechanisms for conflict resolution. As mentioned in Hague convention (1907), article 37, international arbitration can be defined as a binding mechanism with the aim of reaching settlements of inter-state disputes on the basis of the free choice of arbitrators and with reference to the law. The definition stressed on the fact that disputants resorting to arbitration requires abiding by the 'award' in 'good faith' (as cited in Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). The international law commission, in 1953, had defined it as a binding strategy for resolving inter-state conflict based on the principles of international law and on the voluntarily acceptance of disputants (as cited in Wood, 2007). Timothy & Tim (2014) defined it as the process that involves a neutral third party called 'arbitrator' with the mission of giving a binding verdict called 'award' after listening to different arguments and getting evidences from the adversaries.

The process of Arbitration: Theoretical Background

Front-channel negotiations, non-binding strategies, or binding mechanisms are three options available for adversaries when aiming at resolving their dispute. Submission to a binding mechanism may well reflect their deep intention to reach a resolution (Gent & Shanon, 2010).

To start with, Arbitration usually takes different forms, disputants who decide to resort to arbitration must first agree on the form of arbitration. The most prominent form is to assign the case to a panel of arbitrators. This panel usually range from three to five members, so that each adversary should appoint one or two nationals along with a neutral member in which they decide upon (Copeland, 1999). The second form of arbitration is by referring the case to the permanent court of arbitration (PCA) (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). The Hague convention 1899 had established the PCA with the purpose of arbitrating certain cases by its international Bureau and acting as an administrative guide for arbitration commissions (Malintoppi, 2006).

Arbitration is usually compared to adjudication. The major difference is in the fact that while in adjudication the parties should submit the case to a permanent court as ICJ, disputants, under arbitration, they have larger freedom since they can freely choose the arbitrators and the form of arbitration (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Along with the freedom of selecting the arbitrators, disputants maintain significant degree of control over the arbitration process and issue disputed (Mishell, 2016). This considerable control over the process is derived from the 'compromise'. The compromise is a pre-existing agreement that determines the path of the arbitration process. It defines all the principles and prospects of the arbitration process and act as guide for the arbitrators (Raymond, 1995). the compromise further specifies the rules of the process including the location, the method of financing the process, and most notably the exact question to be examined by the arbitrators (Copeland, 1999). Copeland had stressed on the fact that identifying the area of dispute is of special importance because it determines the scope for the arbitrator's authority.

The second mechanism within the arbitration process is related to the awards. In fact, the compromise should further include how the arbitrators should reach their award and how the awards should be practically implemented. The general guideline is that arbitrators should closely observe the principles of international law when coming up with their verdict (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Yet, arbitration grants the disputants the right to charge the arbitrators with any other sources of references as for instance, Municipal laws, or a combination of international

norms and domestic laws. Furthermore, the arbitrator's powers are only confined to the terms of references that the disputants had identified for them, and accordingly arbitrators should observe the issues and scope identified to them so as to escape the problem of deeming the award as 'null' (Copeland, 1999).

Furthermore, the essence of the legality of arbitration is embedded in the fact that the award is 'binding' (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Gartner (2014) had highlighted that the binding nature of the awards is a primary characteristic of arbitration and that final verdicts are elementary for the effectiveness of arbitration and added that the failure to deliver a binding award challenge the core values of arbitration.

Hence, being less formal than adjudication and more legal than mediation, arbitration thus falls between the two strategies, where the adversaries freely choose the arbitrators and the rules that govern the process, yet they submit themselves to a binding award (Raymond, 1955).

The Effectiveness of Arbitration: Literature Review

Given this hybrid nature of legality and flexibility, arbitration had attracted extensive scholarly attention. On the examination of the effectiveness of arbitration, scholars have been split into three groups. The first camp of scholars had argued for the effectiveness of arbitration. The second camp highlighted the limitations of arbitration, and the third argued that the effectiveness of arbitration is conditioned by certain factors.

Starting with the first camp of scholars, Gent and Shanon (2010) argued for the effectiveness of arbitration which is attributed to its legal nature that increases the legitimacy of the verdict, and added that this legality associated with the binding awards provides decision makers with political cover domestically. Malintoppi (2006) added that arbitration proves efficient in sensitive disputes due to the legitimacy of the awards given which allow leaders to escape public's resentment. Weisat and Beuk (2018) argued that arbitration is time-saver, less costly and respond to the adversaries' need of confidentiality. Furthermore, the parties' control over the process and the flexibility within the process provides disputants with certainty and confidence.

On the other extreme of the spectrum, another camp of scholars had argued that arbitration is hardly effective in conflict resolution. Fisher (1985) highlighted that arbitration is subject to biases and partiality arguing that impartiality is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of arbitration (as cited in Gent & Shanon, 2010). Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), Furthermore, pointed out to arbitrations' lack of enforcement mechanism to enforce the awards. Similarly, Gent and Shanon (2013) stated that although the outcomes of the arbitration process are legal decisions, it remains states 'political choice to abide by the given award. Moreover, Duijzentkuns and Dawkins (2015) argued that, due to its legal nature, arbitration fell short in addressing political conflicts, and its effectiveness is confined to less intensive conflicts.

In the middle ground between these two camps, a group of scholars perceived the efficiency of arbitration as conditioned by several factors. For instance, Gent and Shanon (2011) argued that the effectiveness of arbitration depends on the salience of the issue where disputants are more reluctant to accept an outcome in issues with strategic importance. Raymond (1996) argued that the effectiveness of arbitration depends on the regime type. Stating that arbitration between

democratic regimes breed successful outcomes. Copeland (1999) further argued that the effectiveness of arbitration rests on the level of trust between adversaries.

Aside with the third camp of scholars, and with special focus on interstate territorial conflicts, the paper argues that the effectiveness of arbitration in conflict resolution is conditioned by the nature of the conflict. By utilizing the Rann of Kutch case and the Eritrean-Ethiopian dispute, the paper highlights that arbitration proved hardly effective in resolving value-based territorial conflicts for the reasons of: the legal nature of arbitration and disputants' readiness to compromise.

Case 1: The Rann of Kutch

The case represents a territorial conflict between Pakistan and India in the period of 1964 till 1968 (Untawale, 1974). This case had been described as one of the prominent incidents of international arbitration since world war two (Wetter, 1971). The two states had been in conflict for nearly 10 years over a territory called 'the Rann', in the southwestern area between the Sind (part of Pakistan) and the Kutch (part of India) (Wetter, 1971), where each of the two parties had different historical claims to the land since the partition (Utwale, 1974). On one hand, India had argued that the entire land belongs to the Kutch, while Pakistan had claimed that the northern area of the Rann belongs to the Sind and demanding that the borders be demarked in the middle of the Rann (Copeland, 1999). In 1965 the conflict reached its peak where the Rann witnessed military confrontation between the two adversaries. With a British involvement, the two disputants managed to reach a cease fire and agree to submit the case for arbitration.

India and Pakistan have signed the 'compromise' that define the rules of the arbitration procedures. Each state had appointed a non-national and the UN secretary had appointed the panel's chairman (Copeland, 1999). The compromise had explicitly stated that the outcomes of the arbitration are to be treated as final and binding (Singh, 1968). The question of the tribunal is to give a verdict on the demarcation in the Rann. The arbitrators had examined different arguments and evidences presented by both parties as well as listening to oral hearings (Wetter, 1971). Till the award was finally issued in 1968, that states that certain areas in the north of Rann belonged to Pakistan and the rest of the territory belongs to India (Copeland, 1999).

When assessing arbitration in the Rann of Kutch case, it is argued that the mechanism proved a success in resolving the outstanding conflict since the award was practically and jointly observed by the disputants and with the supervision of the tribunal (Wetter, 1971). Moreover, the parties showed confidence in the tribunal and no one doubted its authority. Even more, the disputants accept the fact that the borders were 'conterminous' and thus were able to accept concessions (Wetter, 1971).

The effectiveness of arbitration, in this case, is attributed to two main reasons. Firstly, the conflict over the Rann territory did not exemplify a complex political conflict given the fact that the land is of little strategic or economic significance to the parties. As Copeland (1999) highlighted that the land is an inhabited area with limited value. Welter (1971) stated that the land "is a dry salt desert" with limited usages, and although the conflict witnessed military confrontation before arbitration, the conflict can be described as symbolic given the limited strategic importance of the Rann. This historical nature of the conflict, affected the disputants'

readiness to compromise and triggered their acceptance of the award. Secondly, the arbitrational panel managed to escape the legal complexities that is usually associated with the legal binding mechanisms of conflict resolution. Given that the arguments presented by the parties were not legal in nature but rather historical arguments, the tribunal had given its award not on the mere interpretations of international law but also on the thorough examination of evidences provided by the adversaries (Singh,1968), thus issuing a far sighted and flexible award (Utwale,1974).

Case 2: Eritrea-Ethiopia Dispute

The Eritrea-Ethiopia case is an intensive dispute that took place in the years between 1998 to 2000. The Eritrean military troops had occupied the area of 'Badme'. Badme is inhabited by 'trigryans' who claimed themselves as Ethiopians and have been ruled by the Ethiopian authorities (Abbink,1998). Ethiopia condemned the Eritrean occupation of the area arguing that it infringes upon the sovereignty of Ethiopia. Eritrea on the other hand, declared its entitlement to the territory since the Italian colonialism (Gray,2006). Fighting escalated tremendously in year 2000 and Ethiopia had made significant victories by seizing Badme and other Eritrean lands till reaching a stalemate.

The two parties then sought a legal approach to their dispute by resorting to arbitration. They signed a 'compromise' reaching a cease fire and indicates the formation of two arbitral commissions each with specific areas of examination (Tsfay,2012) The first is the boundary tribunal which had the mission of issuing a binding award with regards to the demarcation of boundaries between the two states. The 'claims tribunal' had to provide its verdict on the damages and losses of the 1998-2000 war (Tsfay,2012). The terms of reference for both tribunals, are limited to principles of international law and the colonial treaties (Gray,2012). The boundary commission issued its verdict in 2002, stating that Badme belongs to Eritrea. Yet, it was doomed by Ethiopia as invalid and inconsistent with international law (Gray,2012). Similarly, the award of the commission tribunal was rejected by Eritrea condemning the tribunal of exceeding its authority (Abbink,1998)

When assessing the effectiveness of arbitration in this case, arbitration proved inappropriate for solving the conflict. Although the two tribunals had given their awards, the conflict continued and neither party abided by the awards. This can be traced back to two reasons: firstly, unlike the Rann of Kutch case, the Eritrea-Ethiopia dispute is identified as a political multidimensional conflict (Tsfay,2012). As Tsfay highlighted that the conflict has cognitive, nationalist and emotional dimensions which harden the possibility for the parties to accept concessions. Neither Ethiopia nor Eritrean were willing to give up their claims to the land, unlike the Rann of the Kutch case where the disputed territory was uninhabited and of limited strategic importance, the land of dispute here is inhabited by Ethiopian citizens thus giving the conflict a nationalist and sovereign dimension, hence, touching upon interests that parties would never accept to subordinate (Copeland, 1999). Zondi and Rejiours (2006) argued that arbitration in the case of the Eritrean-Ethiopian dispute may be perceived as a tool of conflict management since cease fire was achieved. Yet, it is by all means failed to achieve conflict resolution since it failed to come up with a long-lasting settlement (as cited in Tsfay,2006).

Secondly, many attributed the failure of the process to the inflexible, legal-confined nature of the tribunals. Given that the compromise specifies that the terms of reference are confined to

international law and specific treaties. Which hindered the tribunal from assessing other political claims to land, unlike the Rann of Kutch case where arbitrators practiced a larger degree of flexibility leading to an uncontested award. As Tesfay (2012) pointed out that arbitration based on mere legal means is ineffective in resolving value-based conflicts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is necessary to highlight that no single mechanism has the capacity to

resolve all disputes. Although arbitration had proved effective in resolving certain

conflicts, it is not ultimately the appropriate strategy for all disputes (Copeland, 1999). With special focus on inter-state territorial conflicts, the paper showed that the success of arbitration is strongly related to the value of the disputed territory. Which is, in turn, reflected on the adversaries' willingness to compromise and the flexibility of the process. As shown in the cases, while arbitration appeared effective in the Rann of Kutch case due to the apolitical nature of the conflict associated with the flexibility of the tribunal, it seemed less efficient in the Eritrean-Ethiopian case due to the political and nationalist dimensions associated with the mere legality of the tribunal.

BIOS**Prof. Charles W. Kegley Jr.**

Charles W. Kegley, Jr, is founding partner of Kegley International, Inc and Distinguished Pearce Professor of International Relations Emeritus at the University of South Carolina, where he served as chairman of the Department of Government and International Studies 1981-85 and as co-director (with Lawrence S. Eagleburger) of the Byrnes International Center from 1985-88.

He has held faculty appointments at Georgetown University, the University of Texas, the People's University of China, Rutgers University, the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva, and was a Pew faculty Fellow at Harvard University. He served as president of the International studies Association 1993-94.

Writing and publishing extensively, his books include *The Global Future 4th Edition* (2012), *World Politics: Tend and Transformation 14th Edition* (2012), and *After Iraq: The Imperiled American Imperium* (2007). The 16th edition of *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (S. Blanton and C Keegley) was published in Arabic.

Prof. Gregory A. Raymond

Gregory A. Raymond (Ph.D. University of South Carolina, B.A. Park College) is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Boise State University, where he was the inaugural holder of the Frank and Bethine Church Chair of Public Affairs, and served as the founding director of the Honors College, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, and director of the Survey Research Center. A veteran of the U.S. Army and former Pew Faculty Fellow at Harvard University, Raymond has received Boise State's outstanding researcher and outstanding teacher awards, served on the Idaho State Board of Education's Higher Education Research Council, and was selected as the Idaho Professor of the Year in 1994 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. He has published over 100 articles, reviews, and essays on foreign policy and world politics, and has lectured on international issues at universities and research institutes in 22 countries. His work has been supported by grants from the American Political Science Association, the United States Institute of Peace, the United States State Department, and other government agencies.

Dr. Constantine E. Passaris

Dr. Constantine E. Passaris is Professor of Economics, Faculty of Arts, at the University of New Brunswick (Canada) and on Onassis Foundation Fellow. He is also a National Research Affiliate of the Prentice Institute for Global Population and Economy. He is also a member of the Academic Scientific Board of the International Institute of Advanced Economic and Social Studies (Italy). Professor Passaris is listed in the International Who's Who in Education and the Canadian Who's Who. In 2012, he was conferred the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal for his exceptional Writers and Translators' Center of Rhodes (IWATCH) in Summer 2012. Dr, Passaris' early education was in Alexandria, Egypt.

Dr. Ahmad Khalaf Masa'deh

Dr. Ahmad Khalaf Masa'deh is a Jordanian Politician, Diplomat and a lawyer. He served as a minister, ambassador and chief of an international organization. Today, Ahmad Masa'deh practices law and is the Managing Partner of Khalaf Masa'deh & Partners Ltd. in Amman.

Ahmad Masa'deh's public career began in 2004 when he held the position of Minister for Public Sector Reform, to become the youngest Jordanian assuming the ministerial position in the reign of King Abdullah II. Between 2006 and 2010, Ahmad Masa'deh was the 7th Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the European Union, Belgium, Norway and Luxembourg.

In January 2010, Ahmad Masa'deh was elected Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean to become the first personality to assume this prestigious international post of this organization comprising 43 members of all 27 European Union states and 16 Arab and Mediterranean countries.

In 2006 Ambassador Masa'deh was decorated by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan with the Order of Independence of the First Class. In recognition of his efforts in Jordanian-Belgian relations, His Majesty King Albert II of Belgium decorated him in 2010 with the Order of the Crown of the Grand Cross Class (Grand-Croix de L'Ordre de la Couronne) to become the first Jordanian ambassador to receive this honor.

Honorary Speaker of the Senate of Belgium Dr. Jacques Brotchi

He is a Belgian Professor of neurosurgery and a politician. He was elected as a member of the Belgian Senate in 2004, the Former President of the Senate in Belgium.

From 1989 to 1992, he was the head of the Belgian Society for Neurosurgery. Between 1991 and 1994, he presided over the French Language Society for Neurosurgery. Between 1997 and 2001, he became chairman of the Education Committee of the World Federation of Neurosurgical Societies. Since 2003, he has been a member of the board of the Francqui Foundation. Jacques Brotchi became senator in 2004. In 2005, he joined the scientific committee of the Baillet Latour Prize and became chairman of the World Federation of Neurosurgical Societies.

He is a member of the Belgian Royal Academy of Medicine, the American Academy of Neurological Surgery and of the French Academy of Surgery. In 2000, he was awarded the Joseph Maisin Prize. In 2008, he was one of the two Mensch of the Year of the Centre Communautaire Laïc Juif de Belgique. In May 2007, he was made a baron by King Albert II of Belgium.

Fatima Hussein from BUE

Fatima is a Political Science Student, Degree Year Three After Prep.

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